A Predictive Game Theoretic Model to Assess US - Russian Response to an Islamic Safe-Haven in the Caucasus Region by Hartline, Christopher Wayne
Old Dominion University 
ODU Digital Commons 
Computational Modeling & Simulation 
Engineering Theses & Dissertations 
Computational Modeling & Simulation 
Engineering 
Summer 2010 
A Predictive Game Theoretic Model to Assess US - Russian 
Response to an Islamic Safe-Haven in the Caucasus Region 
Christopher Wayne Hartline 
Old Dominion University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/msve_etds 
 Part of the Operational Research Commons, and the Political Science Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hartline, Christopher W.. "A Predictive Game Theoretic Model to Assess US - Russian Response to an 
Islamic Safe-Haven in the Caucasus Region" (2010). Master of Science (MS), Thesis, Computational 
Modeling & Simulation Engineering, Old Dominion University, DOI: 10.25777/sk27-wz76 
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/msve_etds/37 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Computational Modeling & Simulation Engineering at 
ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Computational Modeling & Simulation Engineering 
Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please 
contact digitalcommons@odu.edu. 
A PREDICTIVE GAME THEORETIC MODEL TO ASSESS US - RUSSIAN 
RESPONSE TO AN ISLAMIC SAFE-HAVEN IN THE CAUCASUS REGION 
by 
Christopher Wayne Hartline 
B.S. June 1997, University of Texas El Paso 
A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of 
Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirement for the Degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
MODELING AND SIMULATION 
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY 
August 2010 
Approved by: 
John A. Sokolowski (Director) 
Catherine M. Banks (Member) 
Andrew J. Collins (Member) 
ABSTRACT 
A PREDICTIVE GAME THEORETIC MODEL TO ASSESS US - RUSSIAN 
RESPONSE TO AN ISLAMIC SAFE-HAVEN IN THE CAUCASUS REGION. 
Christopher Hartline 
Old Dominion University, 2010 
Director: Dr. John Sokolowski 
The thesis examines possible US and Russian policy decisions following the 
establishment of an Islamist safe-haven in Chechnya. Conflicting national policies affect 
the possibility of a negotiated settlement. Domestic and international political 
considerations constrain the decision-making of the two nations. The author applies 
game theory to examine the sequential decision-making of the two nations. The 
extensive form model draws outcome payoff values from a bounded uniform distribution. 
This approach naturally models uncertainty; and, it allows repeated probabilistic 
instantiations of the model. These instantiations produce a range of solutions. The most 
likely outcome was a negotiated settlement, generally following a tit-for-tat strategy. The 
second most likely outcome was a conflict initiated by the US. What-//"scenarios were 
used to explore the model. The scenarios illustrate the flexibility of the model. The 
modeling approach developed in the thesis can be adapted to study other international 
conflicts. The quantitative data, outcome payoff ranges, was contrived by the author 
following an analysis of the literature. While the model developed in the thesis is 
repeatable, similar outcomes assume the would-be modeler is in analytical concurrence 
with the author. Thus, the development of unbiased preference indices is identified as an 
area for future consideration. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM 
This thesis takes a mixed methods approach to research and analyze of the 
likelihood of a new Islamist safe haven and conjectures a response by the US and Russia 
(as developed by Sokolowski and Banks) [1]. The first two chapters are qualitative in 
nature, and the third and fourth chapters are quantitative in nature. The qualitative 
portion has a heavy treatment of relevant history, international relations and strategic 
theory. The quantitative portions use engineering and mathematical concepts to construct 
a meaningful abstraction through which the research question can be examined. 
In addition to posing the research question, the initial chapter of the thesis 
provides the motivating force for the research. It explains why an alternative Islamist 
safe-haven is needed and why the Muslim enclave of the Caucasus might be a likely 
location. Subsequently, this chapter examines US and Russian concerns within the 
Caucasus. These considerations are expounded upon in the second chapter. Arguments 
in the first two chapters provide the basis for policy conflict between the US and Russia. 
Namely, what is the appropriate anti-terrorist response given the establishment of an 
Islamist safe-haven in Chechnya? US and Russian decision-making is modeled in 
chapter 3 using game theory. Specifically, what will the two nations do when confronted 
with the realization that their opponent plays a role in the eventual outcome? The 
research question is: Will the US use force to eliminate an Islamist threat in Chechnya 
despite the region being within the Russian sphere of influence (SOI)? 1 
1 Citation format for this manuscript is taken from the Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation 
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1. THESIS AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
The Global War on Terrorism has created limited geopolitical congruence 
between two historical adversaries, the US and Russia. Russia's assistance in the 
opening stages of the US - led attack on Afghanistan was motivated by a desire to 
eliminate a mutual enemy - transnational Islamists. The contemporary Islamist threat has 
been the Taliban and Al Qaeda, originally located in Afghanistan. This shared national 
security threat has led to limited policy congruence between the US and Russia. Though 
congruence of policy has had some success globally, regionally the policies of these two 
nation states are colored by opposing national interests. Each nation suspects that left to 
its own, its competitor would attempt to re-make the region in its own best-interest. 
The Caucasus region is important to the US and Russia because of: 1) its strategic 
energy reserves; 2) its geographic proximity to NATO efforts in Afghanistan and; 3) its 
strategic proximity to the southern border of Russia. An Islamist safe-haven in the 
Caucasus could present a threat to both states. For Russia it could herald continued 
instability on its southern periphery and increasing Islamic influence within traditionally 
Slavic Russia. For the US this discovery could force a policy change by threatening the 
existing regional balance of power. 
The relocation presumes that operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other fronts 
have begun to dislocate Islamists from their traditional sanctuaries. For the US this 
operational success comes with the attendant realization that the Caucasus is within 
Russia's traditional sphere of influence. Thus, a safe-haven in the Caucasus is deemed 
unacceptable by both states. Policy deliberations could be difficult, and likely more so 
for the US given Russia's sense of strategic distance. Traditionally, Russia has been keen 
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to events in the Northern Caucasus and would likely prefer the US not interfere within its 
sphere of influence. This single consideration could stymie swift US action. 
For this thesis a safe-haven represents a secure location for an Islamist cadre and a 
limited force generating capability. Since such a safe-haven exists on the operational / 
strategic boundary it provides operational planning, acts as a geographic base, and 
enables the development of strategic communications. This begs the questions: "Why 
does a safe-haven need to exist" and; "Why the Caucasus"? 
a) Why a new Islamist safe-haven? 
Changing US strategy in Afghanistan and the Iraq Theater(s) of War (TOW) 
Multi-national military operations against Islamists have been successful on a 
number of fronts. Efforts to disrupt financial support to Islamists have been successful. 
Violence in Iraq is down from its height in 2006/early-2007. These successes have led to 
renewed efforts in Afghanistan. The Obama administration has deployed an additional 
17,000 combat troops and 4,000 advisors to Afghanistan. As of the 4th of September 
2009 an additional troop increase beyond the 21,000 already allocated for the 
Afghanistan Theater has not been ruled out. The concentrated effort in Afghanistan and 
attention to crucial regional states like Pakistan solidify a new strategic plan focused on 
the elimination of Islamist activity in Afghanistan and north-west Pakistan. 
Increased operational tempo in Afghanistan 
The war in Afghanistan continues after almost seven years; for all practical 
purposes Afghanistan has been in a state of violent conflict for thirty years. The strategic 
ends being sought by the US and International Security Assistance Forces - Afghanistan 
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(ISAF) differ from those of the Soviets circa 1979. During the Soviet intervention the 
military goal was the destruction of Afghan resistance through the application of military 
might. ISAF approaches the governance problem from the opposite direction. The ISAF 
in coordination with the Afghan government intends to defeat insurgents through 
reconciliation. To this end local security is a parallel line of operation. Population centers 
are secured with increasing ISAF and Afghanistan National Security Force (ANSF) 
capacity. 
ISAF operations conducted in Helmand province in July 2009 signaled an 
operational change in the Afghan conflict. Helmand province is a Taliban stronghold and 
the center of opium production. Operations in Helmand province, ahead of the Afghan 
presidential elections, were either a preemptive spoiling attack designed to disrupt local 
insurgent tactical plans or they were decisive strikes meant to hinder the operational 
capabilities of the Taliban regionally. Either way the increased operational tempo of 
ISAF in conjunction with the planned increases in the number of ANSF could likely force 
organized Taliban insurgents into a strategic defensive.2 As Islamist resources are 
threatened or diminish, the need for a new safe-haven could increase. The decrease in 
resources is the result of: a) political reconciliation and ISAF/ANSF operation; b) 
decrease in tangible resources (weapons, material, money and poppy) and; c) continuing 
pressure in Pakistan. 
2 In On Protracted War, Mao Tse-tung identified three stages of an insurgency: the strategic defensive, the 
strategic stalemate, and the strategic offensive-counteroffensive. Free copies available on-line at 
http://www.marx2mao.eom/Mao/PW38.html#sl 
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Increased Pakistani effort: domestic blow-back and the international response 
Since the attack in Mumbai, India, Pakistan's role in defeating Islamists has 
received increased scrutiny from other nations. The US has signaled that tacit 
compliance with NATO activities is no longer good enough. The US views Pakistan as 
an important front in the conflict against radical Islam. At the macro-level Pakistani 
opinion seems less certain. But, Islamist attacks at home have made terrorism a domestic 
concern in Pakistan. 
The attack on a police academy in Manawan, Pakistan had limited tactical success 
for Baitullah Mehsud's Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), though it could likely become a 
strategic failure. Few police were injured and the attack was handily dealt with by 
Pakistani police special operations units. It is expected that this event has reinforced the 
need for vigorous action in Pakistan in order to defeat Islamic terrorists. And, it has 
steeled the resolve of citizens and politicians while providing a needed victory for the 
Pakistani security forces [1]. Later, in August 2009 Baitullah Mehsud was killed in an 
Unmanned Ariel System (UAS) attack. He was likely targeted as a result of his 
increasing notoriety in the region. Baitullah Mehsud was killed by a US drone; it is 
unclear as to the degree of cooperation and integration with which the US and Pakistani 
security forces operated during the attack. 
In a speech delivered to the United State Congress on 22 April 2009 the US 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made the case that the Taliban and Islamists pose a 
threat to the Government of Pakistan. This speech was not a policy brief for the US 
Congress. It was a message for Western policy makers - Pakistan needs our help. The 
day prior, the Taliban reported that they were in control of a sizeable amount of the 
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Buner district of Pakistan, approximately 60 miles from Islamabad [2]. This speaks to 
the ideological confusion in Pakistan. On one hand the citizens see themselves as (Sunni) 
Muslims who should not join an armed conflict against other (Sunni) Muslims. And, 
religion aside, they do not want to be a patsy for US regional goals. On the other hand, 
the brutal rule of violence and chaos that the Taliban brings is not palatable either [3]. In 
short, it would appear that maintaining a transnational Islamist organization in Pakistan 
will become increasingly more difficult. And, moving such an organization back into 
Afghanistan would be worse. The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) is 
managing US efforts in both countries and it seems be improving their ability to 
coordinate operations within and between the two nations. Thus, this research proffers 
that a new safe-haven is required. 
Summary: Why Islamists need a new safe-haven 
Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and other fringe Islamist groups in Pakistan are under 
increasing pressure, resulting from the confluence of six factors. 
1.) increasing troop deployments to the region. Beyond the increase in 
operational capacity this increase demonstrates US resolve. 
2.) increasing attention from NATO which ensures that events within Afghanistan 
and Pakistan do not go unnoticed. And, this conflict is occurring as NATO transforms 
from an alliance once united against communism to one now against global threats (such 
as transnational terrorists) [4]. 
3.) shifting US foreign policy priority of effort from Iraq to Afghanistan 
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4.) increasing pressure from the Pakistani government and citizenry; both of 
which are unwilling to accept continued strife and instability. 
5.) surging UAS attacks into safe-havens within Pakistan's tribal region 
disrupting the operational level of the "organization". These attacks continue, thus 
unabated by the public protestations from the Pakistani government. As a result, the 
Taliban may be advancing deeper into Pakistan to: 1) out-range US UASs and; 2) add 
considerations regarding collateral damage to the equation. This increases operational 
risk for US commanders. The Taliban believes that US commanders will be less likely to 
attack Taliban targets in urban sprawl capital. But, this places the Islamists and their 
foreign fighters in closer proximity to local security forces. 
6.) depleting available funding to international Islamic terrorist organizations via 
the efforts of the US, NATO and Russia [5]. Operations have been traditionally funded 
through the illicit drug trade (opium) and contributions from governments and non-
governmental entities. Acquiring funding through both sources has become more 
difficult. 
For these reasons the author contends that it is reasonable to expect that Islamists 
may relocate from their established safe-havens in Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran, and 
Islamic Central Asia (Afghanistan and Pakistan) to a Muslim enclave within the Russian 
sphere of influence. Having experienced increasing political and military pressure in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan and the pernicious effect of US UAS attacks, a safe-haven 
inside the Russian sphere of influence offers some unique advantages. 
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b) Why the Caucasus 
The weak and failing Muslim states in the Caucasus region are rife for political 
upheaval. The author contends that there are many similarities between Afghanistan 
circa 1979 and Chechnya 2009. This research includes all of the Caucasus states, but the 
author supposes that the safe-haven will be in Chechnya. This supposition is supported 
by the literature and is elaborated upon on in Chapter Two. 
Regional History 
With the exception of parts of Chechnya and Dagestan, all of the Caucasus was 
once part of either the Ottoman or the Persian Empire, hence the proclivity of Islam in the 
region. The Russian Empire was able to wrest control of much of the Caucasus from the 
Ottoman Empire and the sovereign Shiite state of Persia (Russo - Persian) wars. This 
began what has been dubbed the Great Game, a strategic rivalry between Russia and 
Great Britain. 
Afghanistan, Georgia, and Chechnya were key strategic terrain during this period. 
Afghanistan provided routes from Russia to India, which also served as transit routes for 
trade or attack. Georgia provided ports and access to the Caucasus region and Russia's 
southern flank. Strategic insecurity led to the Caucasian War (1817-1864). After the war 
the states of Caucasus remained under the control of Czar Nicholas II until World War I. 
In 1917 Lenin lost control of the Caucasus states following the Russian 
Revolution. Red Russia began to assert control over the various Caucasus states in 1920. 
By 1924 most had been integrated into the USSR. The states of the Caucasus suffered 
under Stalin, partly the result of the Caucasian/Chechen insurrection of 1940, which 
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resulted in the forced relocation of most ethnic Chechens and many other peoples of the 
Caucasus. Shortly after the fall of the USSR on December 25, 1989 the Southern 
Caucasus became the sovereign states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Nagorno-
Karabakh.3 
This was followed by inner conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The two 
former oblates fought over Nagorno-Karabakh. In 1994 Russia becomes entangled in a 
conflict in Chechnya. The conflict unfolds in two stages. The First Chechen War ended 
in 1996, and a Second Chechen War was from 1999 to 2008. 
Culture, religion, ethnic considerations in the Northern Caucasus and Russia 
The Caucasus region is a complicated, heterogeneous collection of states. Some 
states are sovereign, and others are districts of the Russian Federation. Ethnicity, 
geography, history and social conditions have created a region replete with near-constant 
struggle. 
Islam has been common in the Northern Caucasus since before the Caucasian 
Wars, and Russia is now undergoing its own Islamization. Not only are immigrant 
populations beginning to grow in traditionally Slavic portions of Russia, Slavs and 
"traditional" Russians are becoming Muslim at an increasing rate. Fundamental Islamists 
point-out that Islamic temperance and matrimonial customs could herald the solutions to 
Russia's increasing problems with drug abuse and alcoholism, while polygamy, 
sanctioned by Islam, offers a way to halt population decline [6]. Russia, like many other 
nations, is undergoing a demographic shift. In the future traditional Slavs will be 
3 Nagorno-Karabakh is internationally unrecognized but autonomous 
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outnumbered by Asians and Central Asians. Likewise, the Orthodox Church is on the 
decline and Islam is on the rise. These two facts have political implications for southern 
Russia and the nation as a whole. 
US economic interests in the region 
US interests rest in-part on the energy reserves of the Caspian Basin and their 
transport mechanisms the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) 
pipelines. Oil from Azerbaijan a "pro-western", Muslim, non-OPEC member flows 
through these pipelines, from Georgia into Europe and the global energy market[7]. The 
US also benefits from increasing economic and political integration between Eastern and 
Western Europe. Specifically, this integration reduces the leverage that Russia has on 
Eastern European governments. The latter issue troubles Russia; the former is cause for 
much greater consternation. Both the BTC and BTE pipelines were built specifically to 
bypass Russia despite increased costs and a circuitous route. Both of these pipelines 
originate in Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan's northern neighbor is fellow 
Muslim state, Dagestan. Azerbaijan is a weak US proxy in the region. US - Azeri ties 
were stronger in the 1990s than they are today. 
It is fair to note that Azerbaijan is not a bastion of democratic hope, nor a crusader 
of enlightened, Western ideals.4 Azerbaijan presents a facade of democracy, a 
government in which secular and political moderation is maintained by the severe 
repression of political Islam [8]. The US seems less concerned with Azerbaijan than with 
4 Many authors believe that US policy towards Middle Eastern regimes has placed the United States in the 
myriad conflicts that continue to boil in and around the Arabian Peninsula. A particularly potent example 
is offered by Andrew Bacevich, The Limits of Power: End of American Exceptionalism. 
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the influence held by the Northern States. From the US perspective Azerbaijan's 
neighbors to the north represent a growing regional threat. Unrest and violence ebbs and 
flows from Chechnya to Dagestan and might well flow into Azerbaijan. Upheaval in 
Azerbaijan could have an effect regionally on Western policies and globally on oil 
dependent economies. 
Russian regional economic and security concerns 
From the Russian perspective they need neither explain, nor justify their policies 
towards a region that was once part of the USSR and lies on their southern border. 
Russian politicians have shown the ability to convert political strife between Russia and 
the US into domestic, political capital by simply ignoring US wishes [9]. Combining the 
fact that the Caucasus are geographically Russia's Mexico with the realization of 
tremendous energy potential in the region serves to harden Russian policy regarding the 
region. 
Significant oil reserves have only served to make political issues more intractable. 
The US and Russia both have reasonable claims to legitimate interests in the region. But, 
the reader should consider the role that potential energy reserves play in these interests. 
The US is the world's largest net importer of oil, while Russia's economy is dominated 
by energy exportation. Cheap oil is good for the US and bad for Russia. Russia's 
security concerns go beyond pure economics. 
The near continuous instability in the region represents a concern for Russia. The 
Caucasus forms Russia's southern flank. In the Northern Caucasus Sunni Muslim 
Dagestan, Chechnya, and to a lesser extent Ingushetia, continue to be security problems 
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for the Russian Federation. Chechnya is considered a destroyed state. Instability from 
this region could migrate into the Slavic, Eastern-Orthodox interior of Russia and affect 
important Southern cities such as Volgograd. Likewise, instability in the region can 
affect US regional partners such as Azerbaijan and Georgia, thus drawing US attention. 
However, recent history seems to indicate that the US and Russia have paid little 
attention to the other's concerns. A case in point is the Russian invasion of Georgia in 
August 2008. 
And, as of July 2009 US policy continues to be that Georgia should be allowed to 
become a member of NATO at some future point, a policy that Russia has vehemently 
rejected. The complicated relationships among the nations of the Caucasus, the US, and 
Russia could explain why so little seems to change. And then there is Armenia. 
Armenia is the Russian proxy in the Southern Caucasus. Russia and Armenia 
have had good relations since before the February Revolution (1917). The same cannot 
be said for Russian - Georgian relations. Georgia's Rose Revolution in 2003 and its 
subsequent efforts towards Westernization have rekindled historical hostilities between 
Russia and Georgia. While the origin of this hostile relationship is unknown it appears to 
have increased in the last three decades. Eduard Shevardnadze, former Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and the Politburo was frequently publically criticized by then Prime 
Minister Boris Yeltsin. And, during Georgia's conflicts with its break-away republics of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russian troops supported the break-away republics. To the 
point, Russian forces allegedly led the separatist attack into the Abkhazian capital. Later, 
the Russian-Georgian War of 2008 erupted as a tangible manifestation of the hostilities 
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between the two nations. The conflict did not spread. It lasted less than two weeks but 
the political and physical destruction in Georgia was apparent. In an unexpected turn of 
events, even though Russia was still conducting military operations in Chechnya, 
Chechens joined with Russia in the war against Georgia. This is more evidence that Pro-
Western states and Georgia in particular, are not liked in the region. 
In summary, Russia is concerned with three things. First, the economics of the 
global oil market, by bypassing Russian territories the BTE (Azerbaijan - Georgia -
Turkey) and BTC (Azerbaijan - Georgia - Turkey) pipeline does not provide Russia a 
transport tax on oil removed from the Caspian Basin and sold in the European market. 
Second, instability in the region is a security concern for Russia because it could spread 
into Russia. Third, the instability and US attention in the region due to the US's has 
political ties with Georgia and Azerbaijan: Azerbaijan produces the oil Georgia provides 
the ports.5 
Uncomfortable realities 
The above analysis concludes the following: given the volatility of US - Russian 
relations in the Caucasus region and the expected future destruction or strategic isolation 
of Islamist safe-havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan, there exists the potential for an 
operational relocation of Islamist safe-havens to the Caucasus. 
5 The ports of Poti and Batumi were among the last places for the withdrawal of Russian forces following 
the conflict in 2008. 
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Figure 1. Map 1 : The Caucasus states 
Source: John O' Loughlin and the University of Colorado at Boulder, 2007 
Chechnya could become the next Islamist safe-haven. If this occurred the new 
safe-haven would establish a base for jihad on the border of Europe and Central Asia 
(Figure 1). It would be within the reach of NATO and the US, but wholly within the 
Russian sphere of influence. While there are ethnic and cultural differences between 
Arab/Persian Muslims and European Muslims, historically this has not precluded them 
from working towards shared goals. In fact Chechnya and the Taliban have a shared 
history going back to the early 1990s (which is will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Two). 
Establishing a base in the Caucasus could be beneficial for Islamists for many 
reasons. Probably the most apparent reason is its geopolitical location relative to Russia. 
A US/NATO attack could be cost prohibitive for diplomatic and political reasons. From 
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a political stand-point any action against Islamists in the Caucasus would be slowed by 
diplomatic wrangling with Russia in the UN. From a diplomatic stand-point, NATO 
sanctioned operations in Afghanistan goes without asking. While diplomatically 
unsettling, disregarding claims of national sovereignty while launching UAV attacks into 
Pakistan is quasi-permissible. But, conducting military operations in Chechnya is 
something else completely. Russia wants the final say in the region. This nuanced 
diplomatic perspective of unspoken rules regarding Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Chechnya 
is understood and could act as barrier to coalition forming aboard and policy formulation 
in the US. 
Though security threats may be present in the Caucasus neither the Russian 
response nor the US response should be considered a. fait de accompli. An aggressive US 
plan would tempered by anticipated Russian contention. Similarly, Russian actions could 
provoke a US response. Conflicting policies limit what Russia and the US can do and 
expect to gain in the region. 
c) Hegemon v. Hegemon: Conflicting policies regarding the Caucasus 
Russian and US policy consensus goes only so far. Though there is general 
agreement on certain broad, global issues there is disagreement on the ways and means 
used to achieve these common national ends. Specifically, the two nations disagree on 
the means used to bring stability to the Caucasus region and the US role in the Caucasus. 
US - Russian relations have been good when elected officials were willing to focus on 
common interests, but these interests seem to be few [10]. Nuclear arms reduction is one 
example in which common interest has helped to align national policies. US and Russian 
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policies differ on many issues; they can be, diametrically opposed or mutually exclusive. 
This appears to be the case in the Caucasus region. In this volatile region US and 
Russian policies conflict, both pursue policies that increase their perceived national 
security but as political theorist Joseph Nye points out one nation's security often results 
in another's insecurity [11]. 
US political interest in the region 
Beyond the economic interests discussed earlier, the Caucasus region has strategic 
value based on its geographic location relative to Russia. Control of the Caucasus could 
provide the US political leverage in its dealings with Russia. With this perspective it 
seems reasonable to presume the US has chosen its partners based on their geographic 
location as well as on their economic potential. 
While not a global super-power Russia still holds sway in the region and it could 
create an Eastern European block to challenge NATO and the EU. From the US 
perspective, Russia is still the global antagonist and a counterpoint to US power. 
Containing Russian power is in the interest of the US. As alluded to Georgia and 
Azerbaijan play a role in US regional policy formulation. The US has a national interest 
in both states. The US supports the eventual inclusion of Georgia and Azerbaijan, along 
with the Ukraine, into NATO and the EU. Both institutions, NATO and the EU, threaten 
Russia's military and economic dominance within the region. 
The US continues to consider sponsoring Ukraine's admittance into NATO. The 
US also seems unwilling to drop their support for Georgia's NATO aspiration. Current 
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US policy (as expressed by Vice-President Joseph Biden) takes a wait-and-see approach 
towards their membership. 
The US and Azerbaijan have political ties. Azerbaijan is a member of the 
Partnership for Peace (PfP). It is working towards European Union (EU) membership 
through the EU-Azerbaijan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. It has provided 
troops for NATO operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. It was a force provider during 
the early stages of the Iraq War. And, it is a non-OPEC nation, and the originator of the 
two major pipelines in the region. However, since 2002 Azerbaijan has pursued a neutral 
policy towards Russia and the US, likely because this would seem to be in Azerbaijan's 
best interest. 
Azerbaijan understands the role it plays in Russia's plans to preserve its influence 
over the Southern Caucasus. Azerbaijan also understands that they are of interest in the 
larger global community because of their hydrocarbon reserves. Finally, though 
Azerbaijan plays both sides they realize that Russia still maintains close ties to Armenia. 
And, Russia attacked Georgia for their aggressive actions against South Ossetia. This 
could signal Russian intervention on the Armenian side in the event of a second Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict. In the end, Azerbaijan's future is tied to its ability to produce oil and 
Georgia's ability to get it to port. While Azerbaijan is happy with neither President 
Saakashvili's actions in the summer of 2008, nor the US's response, there isn't anything 
practical that they can do about it [12]. 
US - Georgian relations and US policy goals were diminished by the recent 
(2008) Russian - Georgian War. As one scholar put it the most troubling political 
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outcome of the war was Washington's inability to control Georgia's President 
Saakashvili and Russia's "proclivity to see hard power as the true currency of 
international relations" [13]. Georgia's President Saakashvili views NATO and the 
European Union as institutions for democratic change in Georgia. Prior to the conflict 
both issues were being "fast-tracked". In 2006 NATO offered an "Intensified Dialogue" 
to Georgia, which in practical terms represented progress towards eventual full 
membership. 
Georgian conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia complicated Georgia's NATO 
integration. Presumably, the war with Russia has stopped Georgia's integration into 
NATO for the time being. Georgia continues to be an important US ally in the region. 
The BTC / BTE pipelines run through Tbilisi. And, Georgia provides two large Black 
Sea ports strategically situated between the Balkans, Eurasia, and the Arabian Peninsula. 
The US has limited influence in the Northern Caucasus. With the exception of 
Chechnya, all of the states in the Northern Caucasus are members of the Russian 
federation. Chechnya became independent in 2003. Historically the US has rarely 
objected to Russian actions there. One notable exception was President William 
Clinton's reference to the Second Chechen war as a "civil war." Though he was 
criticized for his statement it was not inaccurate. First, Chechnya has not been declared 
independent. And second, radical Muslims groups from Chechnya had conducted 
numerous attacks in Dagestan with the expressed purpose of "liberating" Dagestan from 
the "corrupt" Dagestani government. 
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In summary, the US understands four fundamental facts: 1) Russian policy in the 
Caucasus is based on economic realities as well as geo-political considerations; 2) the US 
and Russia still view each other as geo-political competitors with proxies in the 
Caucasus; 3) an Islamist safe-haven in the Caucasus is in Russia's traditional sphere of 
influence and; it would literally be on Russia's southern border. And, any action taken 
against it could have significant consequences, and; 4) the balance of power in the region 
is a zero-sum game. A loss suffered by the US is a gain for Russia. As such, some 
instability in the Caucasus could be beneficial for Russia. Thus, Russia might be 
unwilling or unable to take decisive action against an Islamist safe-haven in Chechnya. 
Russian interests and policies in the region 
Without too much simplification it can be reasonably stated that Russian policies 
are generally contrary to those of the US. Any gain in influence by the US has an 
attendant decrease in influence for Russia. Where political influence is considered US 
and Russia are playing a zero-sum game. 
Russia see's the BTC/BTE pipeline as a Western economic tool to provide the EU 
oil while preventing Russia from profiting from transit rights. These pipelines limit 
Russia's ability to influence European energy markets. Recently Russia began 
negotiations with Azerbaijan for the transportation of hydrocarbons through Russia 
(South Stream pipeline). 
NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine continues to be a point of 
contention. NATO was created specifically as a counter to Soviet power in Europe. 
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Admitting Georgia and/or Ukraine into NATO would literally place NATO on the border 
of Russia. 
Russia maintains close ties with Armenia, Azerbaijan's rival. The semi-
autonomous Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh was the result of Armenian- Azeri War of 
1991. Russia supported the succession of Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan prior to 
the war. Russia has supported the Georgian break-away republics of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia. Russian troops organized and led separatist attacks on the Abkhazian capital 
of Sukhumi in 1994. They also provided tactical air support with Russian aircraft 
striking Georgian forces in Abkhazia [14]. 
In short, observable Russian policy is one of pragmatism. What is good for 
Russia is right for the Caucasus. And, a large collection of micro-states caught up in 
local conflicts is better than a small group of states united against Russia. Individual 
nations/states can fight among themselves along as they do not threaten Russia's 
economic or social stability. In fact, in-fighting may be beneficial for Russia. The 
splintering among the states makes them weaker and more susceptible to Russian 
influence. Of note is Russia's support for the separation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
from Georgia as well as the Nagorno-Karabakh separation conflict between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. 
US - Russian relations from 1989 through July 2009 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union on 25 December 1989 was seen as a 
diplomatic victory for the US. The US and NATO politically defeated the Soviet Union. 
In the years immediately following the dissolution of the USSR and the creation of the 
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Russian federation Russia was dependent on (predominantly US) foreign aid. This 
provided the US with considerable leverage over Russian policy [15]. As Russia 
recovered and energy prices climbed Russia became less dependent on foreign aid. 
Russians are resentful of excessive, previous Western involvement in their internal 
politics and local issues. Russians believe the US exploited Russian weakness [16]. 
The ten years beginning in 1991 and ending in 2001 saw Russia involved in 
numerous conflicts in the Caucasus region. The US generally divested itself of any 
interest in the area. The Russian - Afghan War had ended in February 1989. In 1991 the 
US and Russia officially ended support to their proxies in Afghanistan [17]. As the 
Southern Caucasus states moved towards independence, factions within these states 
moved for even more independence. This created the enduring separatist conflicts in the 
Caucasus. These conflicts began to resolve in 1994. The first Russian - Chechen War 
began in 1994. The second Russian - Chechen War began in 1999. US policy explicitly 
recognizes these conflicts as internal issues. As mentioned earlier, in August 2008 
Russia attacked Georgia after Russian soldiers in South Ossetia were killed by Georgian 
artillery. Russia stopped short of taking the capital and sacking the government. But, 
they entered peace talks in procession of the Georgian ports of Batumi and Poti. 
Russian soldiers were originally deployed to South Ossetia's as observers 
following accords between Georgian and South Ossetia. However, they were supposed 
to have redeployed to Russia in 1994. Russian actions were viewed as reasonable and 
justifiable by many citizens of the region. But, they were regarded as heavy-handed and 
excessive in the West [18]. On the other hand Georgia has yet to answer for war crime 
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accusations. And, beyond these accusations the proximate cause for the conflict was 
presumably unobserved artillery fire from Georgian units into South Ossetia, technically 
a region of Georgia. In the end, Russia gained regional influence while arguably losing a 
nominal amount of influence in the larger global community. The war was ruinous for 
Georgia. Oddly enough, eight months later, in April 2009 President Medvedev declared 
that Russian operations in Chechnya were complete. This single action closes a chapter 
in Russian history, a Chechen conflict that traces its origin back to the fall of the USSR. 
It was the last such issue that Russia had to come to terms with. 
Events of the last two years seem to indicate that Russia has embarked on a new 
policy, to remake the region to better suit its needs. Through all of this Russia is 
asserting its regional influence while reminding the US that Russia might not be able to 
stop US ambitions globally, but that Russia can make things much more difficult [19]. 
2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The intent of this research is to examine plausible Russian and US policy 
reactions to the establishment of a strategic Islamist safe-haven. This thesis focuses on 
the Northern Caucasus Muslim enclave of Chechnya. 
The research is divided into five chapters. The above first chapter serves as the 
introduction to the research topic. The second chapter is the qualitative research and 
literature review. This chapter illuminates existing qualitative research that is relevant to 
the topic and the modeling paradigm. The third chapter is the quantitative research, the 
model definition and creation. Results will be reported in Chapter four. And, Chapter 
five concludes the research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE REGARDING CHECHNYA, 
POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS IN THE CAUCASUS, AND GAME THEORY 
This chapter expands on the concepts put forth in Chapter One. Chapter One 
answers the questions: "Why is a new safe-haven required" and "Why the Caucasus." 
Chapter One also provides a macro-level view of US and Russian national strategic 
policies specific to the Caucasus. Chapter Two has a narrower scope pre-supposing that 
Islamists will relocate to Chechnya; it sets about the task of deducing why this could 
occur. It proposes policy considerations that could inform US and Russian policy 
subsequent to the establishment of the new safe-haven in the Muslim enclave of 
Chechnya. Chapter Three will introduce the quantitative model. Chapter Three uses the 
analysis to establish US and Russian preferences; and, to further adapt an existing 
extensive form Game Theory model. It concludes with model and simulation 
development. 
The following discussion identifies contemporary events that could provide 
motivation for Islamist relocation. It also examines Islamic Jihad, its creation and role in 
Afghanistan, and its links to the First and Second Chechen Wars. Accordingly, an 
overview of Chechen history follows, placing emphasis on the period following Chechen 
secession from Russia, and the formation of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. The 
thesis provides a qualitative assessment of US and Russian policy preferences regarding 
the region. The discussion concludes with the presentation of the quantitative modeling 
technique used in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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1. CURRENT EVENTS AND THE NEED FOR A NEW STRATEGIC SAFE-HAVEN 
American forces are engaged in what George Friedman characterizes as the 
Fourth World War. It is a war against radical, militant Islamic ideology. As it spreads its 
intensity increases. It threatens established order in the Middle East and Central Asia. 
This conflict represents an emergent threat [1]. This might seem to be an odd statement, 
since by some accounts this war has been going on since 1991. The West continues to 
expend significant resources to secure shaky states and halt the advance of Islamists. 
This fact supports the author's contention that from the US point of view a threat requires 
a response. 
Lord Palmerston recognized that alliances are built on common interest. He did 
not believe in the notion of permanent alliances or permanent enemies. In the past the 
US and Russia have joined forces against Islamists and militant Islam. But, the results 
have rarely been substantive and more often US and Russian relations have been defined 
by conflict, not cooperation. The US supported the Mujahedeen in the 1980s. In the 
1990s the US provided no support to Russia during the Chechen conflicts. Russia did 
provide some support to the US during the initial phases of the US - Afghan War. Russia 
did not support the US war in Iraq; and they do not seem to feel any obligation to support 
US / NATO operations in Pakistan. 
Islamic jihad, as a national security threat, was created more than thirty-years ago. 
It is the result of US and Russian foreign policy in Central Asia and the Arabian 
Peninsula. The general consensus holds that the current war in Afghanistan now enjoys 
parity if not supremacy when it comes to the US resourcing of operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. The US is beginning a troop draw-down in Iraq and a troop increase in 
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Afghanistan. Although Russia does not provide men or military material support in 
Afghanistan, it does have an interest in the outcome of the conflict. 
Afghanistan borders the pro-Russian Islamic states of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan. Afghanistan is in close proximity to the strategic energy reserves of the 
Gulf States. However, prior to the break-up of the Soviet Union, Afghanistan and the 
USSR shared a 2,500 km border. The USSR began its ten year war in Afghanistan in 
1979. The objective of the war was the consolidation of power [2]. The US saw the war 
as an attempt at expansion by the USSR. The US supported efforts against the Soviets, 
specifically the creation and equipping of the mujahedeen. The official Soviet decision to 
withdraw forces from Afghanistan was made on 13 November 1986 [3]. In 1988 the 
Geneva accords signaled the Soviet commitment to withdraw troops, with the last troops 
departing on 15 February 1989 [4]. 
The departure of Soviet troops left the mujahedeen without an enemy. Without an 
evil external force to coalesce animosities tribal and personal anger turned inward. The 
ensuing chaos lasted years. In 1995 the Taliban gained control of the majority of 
Afghanistan. The Taliban and al-Qaeda both have their roots in the Soviet-Afghan War. 
The US is involved in an eight year war in Afghanistan, a nation that has been in a 
state of violent conflict for thirty years. While the violence remains, strategies to control 
it differ. 
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Figure 2. Map 2 : Provinces of Afghanistan with national borders 
Source: http://en.citizendium.org/wiki/Provinces_of Afghanistan 
ISAF operations conducted in Helmand province in the month of July signal an 
operational change in the Afghanistan conflict. Helmand province is a Taliban 
stronghold and the center of opium production (Figure 2). Operations in Helmand 
province, ahead of the Afghan presidential elections are either: 1) preemptive spoiling 
attacks designed to disrupt insurgent operational and tactical plans or; 2) decisive strikes 
that will hinder the operational capabilities of the Taliban regionally. These factors, 
indicative of an increase in operational tempo by ISAF, with the planned increase in 
ANSF will likely force organized Taliban insurgents into a strategic defensive. Thus, 
diminishing capabilities, the result of political reconciliation and ISAF/ANSF operations, 
29 
combined with a decrease in resources (including the poppy crop) along with continuing 
pressure in Pakistan serve as motivation for Islamist relocation. 
2. ISLAMIC JIHAD AND CONFLICT IN THE CAUCASUS 
A straight line links contemporary Islamic terrorists and the Mujahedeen of 1979. 
US support to the Mujahedeen was limited by Congresses' "power of the purse" this was 
not the case in Saudi Arabia for either the government, or for the prominent Saudi 
families such as the bin-Ladens [5]. While the US understood the need for arms and 
equipment to support the Mujahedeen they did not understand that this was not a war 
inspired by a national or political identity. Rather it was fueled by Islam. The 
Mujahedeen viewed the defeat of the USSR as a victory for Islam not a victory for 
Afghanistan or the West [6]. 
In 1996 the Taliban gained control of Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan. In 1998 
they controlled 90% of Afghanistan [7]. Also in 1988, the Azerbaijan - Armenia conflict 
began. Shortly afterwards, Russia is involved in a conflict with Islamists on Russian soil, 
namely the First Chechen War. 
In 1992 Chechnya declared its independence as the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. 
Armed conflict began in 1994. In 1996 Russian President Putin declares that forces from 
the Russian Federation are fighting a war against".. .global Islamic jihad" in Chechnya 
[8]. While the Taliban were taking control of Afghanistan, the Chechen militant Shamil 
Baseyev made at least two trips to Afghanistan in the early 1990s to meet with Emir 
Khattab, [9] a Middle Eastern Arab that he fought with during the Azerbaijan - Armenian 
War (the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict of 1988 to 1994). In 1999 the Russian Chechen 
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conflict spread to the neighboring district of Dagestan, beginning the Second Chechen 
War. The Chechen forces were led by Shamil Baseyev and Emir Kattab. This event is 
characterized as a Russian "civil war" by then President William Clinton [10]. One-year 
earlier the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the de facto independent Chechen Republic of 
Ichkeria had recognized one another as sovereign states. 
The Russian Federation characterizes Chechens fighters as terrorists, whabbists 
receiving financial support and foreign fighters from the Middle-East. Russia even 
threatened attacks against Afghanistan for their alleged material support of Chechen 
rebels. Russia has asserted that this conflict would not end in Chechnya. As it believes 
the Chechen separatists are motivated by jihad, who believe that the Islamic struggle will 
only stop when the Caliphate is established, or presumably when radical motivations are 
removed [11]. 
A review of modern Chechen history reveals that Chechnya is a volatile region 
driven by extremes. As a result of this analysis, the author contends, that Chechnya is a 
possible Islamist safe-haven; and, the case for a Chechen safe-haven is made in the 
following discussion. 
a) The Chechen Wars 
The First Russian-Chechen War began in the summer of 1991 when retired Soviet 
Air Force General Dzhokhar Dudaev began to execute plans to wrest control of Grozny 
and Chechnya from Russia. The political turmoil of the August 1991 coup, between 
President Boris Yeltsin and the Russian Parliament gave Dudayev room to maneuver. 
Some members of Parliament gave their tacit support to Dudayev. Apparently their 
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decision was the result of a power struggle with then President Boris Yeltsin [12]. 
Between 1991 and 1994 Dudayev consolidated power and the Russian military began a 
withdrawal from Chechnya. A Chechen "National Guard" was armed through a 
combination of post-Soviet military sales, theft, and the capture of abandoned Russian 
equipment [13]. 
Armed conflict began on November 26, 1994. Russian Army forces comprised 
approximately 2,500 infantry and 150 armored vehicles. This force also included an 
unknown number of opposition fighters, Chechens either not in favor of independence, or 
not in favor of Dudayev. The Russians planned to envelope Grozny from three-sides. 
Resistance was expected to be minimal and as such complete plans were not developed. 
Nor were armored forces properly integrated, approximately one-third of the armored 
forces left garrison the day before receiving their specific orders on the evening prior to 
the assault. Dudayev, however, expected a fight and made proper preparations. 
Dudayev's intelligence chief had obtained a map that illustrated the Russian plan, 
to include tactical efforts, phasing, and force numbers [14]. Dudayev's plan allowed 
Russian mechanized forces into the city center. This proved to be a significant tactical 
advantage. The utilization of urban terrain harkens back to General Chuikov's defense of 
Stalingrad. This tactical risk paid off much as it did in 1942.6 As armored forces 
progressed deeper into the city center they began to receive anti-armor fire from rooftops 
and basements. Their infantry support was scattered by snipers. Chechen snipers quickly 
6 Hitler viewed Stalingrad (modern day Volgograd) as the gateway to Chechnya and the oil resources of 
the Caspian. In Too Little, Too Late: An Analysis of Hitler's Failure in August 1942 to Damage Soviet Oil 
Production , Joel Hayward quotes Hitler as remarking, "If I do not get the oil of Maikop and Grozny then I 
must end this war." Grozny was a strategic objective in 1942 (for Hitler) and 1818 for Russia. 
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disorganized the small infantry units. Those that survived were rumored to have left the 
fight earlier in order to fill their pockets, looting the surrounding retail stores [15]. What 
was left of this mechanized force was an unorganized resistance that had been ordered to 
go to the center of the city and wait. 
The First Chechen War continued until the end of August 1996. Grozny played 
an important role, as a battleground, during almost two-years of on-again, off-again 
fighting. Grozny would be involved in major combat at least three times. The peace 
agreement ending the First Chechen War called for a referendum on Chechen 
Independence to be held five years from the signature date in 2001 [16]. The Second 
Chechen War began in 1999 with the invasion of Dagestan by wahhabist rebels from 
Chechnya under the direction of Basayev and Kattab. 
Shamil Basayev, regarded as a national hero, held numerous national level 
political positions in the Chechen government. He had officially resigned from his 
political post in 1998. This, his second departure from government was the result of 
increasingly "anti-whabbist policies." There is little doubt that Baseyev's decision was 
influenced by Emir Kattab [17]. In 1999 President Maskhadov again declared the 
establishment of a government of "full-fledged Shari'a law." At this time Baseyev 
claimed that since the President had recognized the authority of the faith over political 
affairs the President was no longer legitimate. Baseyev contended that Chechnya should 
be governed by an Imam, a religious leader [18]. On August 2, 1999 whabbists forces 
associated with Baseyev and Kattab attacked Dagestan. They expected this to be the 
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opening act in a campaign that would establish a Muslim state from the Black Sea to the 
Caspian Sea [19]. 
The operation to "liberate Dagestan" was named for the first Imam of Dagestan 
and Chechnya, Imam Kazi-Mahomed. It included a declaration of war on the grounds 
that the Chechen fighters had come to liberate the people of Dagestan from the 
"murderous government of Dagestan." The Chechens expected to be welcomed as 
Muslim brothers. They expected to be received as courageous fighters come to free 
Dagestan from its evil government and Russian oppression. This was not the case. 
Rather, the Dagestanis perceived this act as terribly aggressive and horribly ungrateful. 
Many Chechens had received refuge from Dagestani families during the First Chechen 
War [20]. Military operations in the winter of 1999/2000 led to, "The liquidation of a 
considerable number of Chechen military and political leaders in Grozny ..." [21]. On 
16 April 2009 Russian President Medvedev issued a decree suspending Russian 
operations in Chechnya. The current Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov claimed 
victory and remarked that the "bandits have been defeated" [22]. 
b) Chechnya after the wars 
Chechnya has been decimated by years of war. Russia characterized the First 
Chechen War as an effort to restore order in a hostile republic. The Second Chechen War 
was characterized as an anti-terrorist action. Russian political leadership viewed this as 
the beginnings of a global war against Islamists. They supported this claim with 
evidence of Islamist receiving support from Middle Eastern countries and international 
non-profits [23]. 
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Fierce fighting and the indiscriminate targeting of civil infrastructure left the 
Chechen economy in shambles. Nicholas Griffin illustrates this point noting that 
kidnapping has become the most lucrative business in the country [24], fighting is seen as 
an honorable reasonable occupation [25]. A French reporter stated of his journey to 
Grozny in April 2000; "I didn't find a single building intact" [26]. Authors Emil 
Souleimanov and Stasys Knezys report similar findings, but they add disturbing details: 
• 15% of the Republic's cultivatable soil is heavily mined 
• 70% of the housing stock has been destroyed 
• unemployment ranges between 80% and 100%) based on age 
• Drug trafficking and crime have become major aspects of the Chechen 
economy 
• 80%o of the country's factories are in ruin [27] 
• the conflict cost Russia approximately 200 billion dollars or 2 trillion 
rubles, the operating budget of the Russian military for a year and a half 
[28] 
After the Second Chechen War Chechnya became notorious for the October 2002 
attack on the Dubrovaka Theater in Moscow and the attack on Beslan School Number 
One in September 2004. These attacks were organized by Shamil Basayev a hero of 
Chechnya, the Muslim Peoples of the Mountains, and a former top political official (First 
Deputy Prime Minister). 
Basayev is named for the third Imam of Chechnya and Dagestan, and members of 
his wahhabist, Chechen separatist organization took over one-thousand hostages in 
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Beslan School Number One (Northern Ossetia). This incident did not endear North 
Ossetians with either the Sunni Muslim Republic of Chechnya or the district of 
Ingushetia. Some Russians believe that while the attack might have been politically 
motivated the target was chosen based on religion and ethnicity. The Beslan attack was 
conducted by wahhabist, Sunni Muslims from Chechnya, planned and organized in 
Ingushetia against the residents of predominantly Eastern Orthodox Christian North 
Ossetia. 
c) Why Chechnya? 
Like Pakistan today, Chechnya in 1994 attempted a political reconciliation with 
Islamists. President Yandarbiyev (second President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria) 
agreed to the establishment of Shari'a law as well as the formation of special units to 
enforce Shari'a law on-sight. President Maskdov (third President of Chechen Republic 
of Ichkeria) followed this course when he became President in 1996. In 1998 he re-
affirms this policy [29]. Militant, radicalized Chechens turned towards whabbism during 
this time period. A schism grew between the government and the soldiers that had fought 
to establish the government. 
There were numerous schisms between the Chechen separatists, the Chechen 
government, and the Russian Federation. The first President of the Chechen Republic of 
Ichkeria, President Dudayev began the secessionist movement in 1991. Dudayev was 
assassinated in Grozny in 1996, just prior to the end of the First Chechen War. That 
same year his First Deputy Prime Minister, Asian Maskhadov negotiated the cease-fire 
terms and the end of the First Chechen War. Dudayev's immediate successor was 
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President Yandaribiyev. From 1996 until 1999 Chechnya existed as a semi-autonomous 
state of the Russian Federation. In 1997 Maskadov returned to politics, becoming the 
third President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Chechnya was scheduled to hold a 
referendum on their political status in 2001. But, the Second Chechen War began in 
1999. The author could find no evidence that this second attack was sanctioned by 
Maskhadov or Yandarbiyev. In fact the opposite appears to be more likely. It has been 
reported that Baseyev was in communication with Russian intelligence officials prior to 
the beginning of the Second Chechen War. More discussion on this will follow later. 
In 2001 Stanislaw Ilyasov became the Chairman of the Government of Chechnya. 
Later in 2001, Akhmad Kadyrov became the first president of Chechnya sanctioned 
(installed) by the Russian government. Both of these positions are supreme executive 
positions that are filled by Russian Presidential decree. Meanwhile, Asian Maskhadov 
continued as the president of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria until his death in 2005. 
In 2004 Yandarbiyev (second President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria), no longer 
in office, was assassinated in Doha, Qatar by Russian security personnel. Later that year, 
Akhmad Kadryov (President of Chechnya) was assassinated by Chechen separatists. Alu 
Alkhanov replaced Akhmad Kadyrov. 
In 2005 Maskhadov was killed in Grozny. Russian officials announce that he was 
killed by Russian Special Forces during a raid in the rural area surrounding Grozny. 
There is speculation that separatists under the control of Ramzan Kadyrov participated in 
this operation. Ramzan Kadyrov was the First Deputy Prime Minister of the Chechen 
Republic, serving within the government of Alu Alkhanov the successor to his father 
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(Akhmad Kadyrov). In 2007 Ramzan Kadryov became President of the Chechen 
Republic with the expressed consent of Russian President Vladimir Putin.7 
In the words of Dmitri Kozak, the Russian Special Presidential Envoy to the 
(Chechen) Region, the region is threatened by "permanent destabilization." He warns 
that continual conflict could lead to the unraveling of federal authority within southern 
Russia [30]. The entire Caucasus region has suffered from the conflicts in Chechnya. 
Violence continues to originate in Chechnya and propagate through the Caucasus. Other 
states in the Northern Caucasus are being pulled into conflict by Islamist terrorists; while 
rarely mentioned bombings and armed assaults still occur in the Northern Caucasus. 
As mentioned in the previous section the Chechen economy is in ruin. Chechnya 
circa 2006 is not unlike Afghanistan circa 1996. Economic ruin and Islamic 
radicalization seem to lead Chechnya towards a hard-line, anti-Russian, Islamist regime. 
Foreshadowing the current situation in a public statement, the first President of the 
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Dudayev expressed the preference that Chechnya should 
become an "institutional secular state." He concluded his remarks saying, ".. .if religion 
takes priority over an institutional secular system, a more striking form of the Spanish 
inquisition and Islamic fundamentalism will emerge." [31] 
Conflict has been a constant in Chechnya for a long time. Some of the conflict is 
related to Chechen culture and clan feuds. Just as likely, much is the result of Russian 
policy towards the area. Prior to the break-up of the USSR Chechnya may have been as 
much as 20% Russian by ethnicity. Under Stalin the ethno-geography was likely even 
more Russian. Stalin's policy of forced migration had ethnic groups moving all over the 
7 Ramzan Kadyrov is the son of Akhmad Kadyrov, the First President of Chechnya. 
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Caucasus and south Russia. Many ethnic Chechens resettled in Chechnya after the fall of 
the USSR. The immigration and "repatriation" of cultural Chechens coupled with the 
hatred and violence of the First Chechen War led to migration of ethnic Slavs and 
Russians from Chechnya, increasing the Muslim concentration in Chechnya. 
Since the beginning of the Chechen Wars Chechnya was considered a haven for 
Islamists. While Dudayev hoped for a secular Chechnya, he accepted the aid of Islamists 
during the First Chechen War. The second (Yandarbiyev) and third (Maskhadov) 
Presidents of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria attempted political reconciliation with the 
Isalmists by enacting Shari'a law. But this tactic did not seem to work, even after three 
proclamations exclaiming the supremacy of Shari'a law. As mentioned all three of these 
individuals were killed by Russian Special Operations forces or Russian Special Security 
Forces. 
The current President Ramzan Kadyrov received the support of President Putin 
upon his ascendance to the position of President. This limits his exposure to Russian 
security forces. His political enemies in Russia are apparently placated. Meanwhile 
seven of his political rivals in Chechnya have been killed [32]. His power extends 
beyond constitutional authority or that provided by his office. Specifically, he still 
commands a sizeable personal Army (the Kadyrovtsy). 
It is difficult to tell if President Kadyrov's ascension is a "good thing." He and 
his father (the First President of the Chechen Republic) both fought with Dudayev and 
Maskhadov during the First Chechen War [33]. On one hand, he attained this position 
with the tacit approval of President Putin. On the other, he has called the Russians 
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"bandits" [34]. President Kadyrov seems to believe that he is in a position of power. It 
would appear as though his political power and personal Army assure his existence 
within Chechnya. Two quotes that seem representative are: "I was always with the 
people. I don't know who changed which side, but I was always with the people." [35] 
and; 2) "I've already killed who I should have killed.... I will be killing as long as I 
live."[36] These quotes are provided because the author contends that they illustrate the 
brutality of the current president; he seems to have a high tolerance for what others would 
consider unseemly. To the point, the questions most relevant to this thesis are: 1) is there 
a historical relationship between Isalmists and the Chechen government and; 2) would 
President Kadyrov allow the establishment of an Islamists safe-haven to proceed in 
Chechnya? 
There is a long history of dubious people interacting in and around Chechnya. 
Yandarbiyev (second President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria) was central in 
initiating the relationship between Chechnya and al-Qaeda. He was a leading fundraiser 
for al-Qaeda. In 2004 Yandarbiyev was killed in Qatar by two undercover GRU officers 
[37]. There are rumors placing Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar in Chechnya after the 
fall of the Taliban in late 2001 or early 2002 [38]. It is uncertain if President Kadyrov 
would allow such visits to occur in the future. Because it is unlikely that Kadyrov would 
support the establishment of an Islamist safe-haven, he is liked by many Chechens. He is 
seen as an agent of change. It does not appear that he would gain anything domestically 
for taking such a risk. 
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On the other hand, Baseyev was a hero to the Chechens. He was linked to the 
Azerbaijan - Armenian War and the Georgian - Abkhazia conflict of 1992. During this 
time it is alleged that he received support from the foreign military directorate of the 
Armed Forces of Russia (GRU) [39]. So, at this point he had the support of Chechens 
and Russia. Later, Baseyev entered into relations with the Taliban in Afghanistan before 
he gained international notoriety during the First and Second Chechen Wars. Recall that 
Baseyev resigned from public office (as Vice-Prime minister) in 1998. Later, in 1999 he 
declared Asian Maskadov (third President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria) an 
illegitimate leader. Baseyev was the operational commander for the terrorist attacks in 
Beslan and the Dubrovka Theater in Russia. Emir Kattab was awarded the Order of 
Honor and the Brave Knight Medal by Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev (the second President of 
the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria) during his acquaintance with Baseyev. Both men are 
rumored to have been linked to Osama bin Laden. And, both made trips to Afghanistan 
numerous times between 1991 and 1994 [40]. In fact the Taliban and Chechen rebels 
seemed to enjoy good relations. 
"Yandarbiev, who briefly succeeded Dudayev as President after his death in 
1996, was central in initiating the relationship with al-Qaeda and got the Taliban to 
recognize Chechnya's independence. Leading militants like Basayev, Khattab and Walid 
have all trained in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan or Pakistan along with several 
hundred other Chechens. According to Rohan Gunartna, an expert on al-Qaeda, Baseav 
and Khattab and Walid have all had close relations with Osama bin Laden, and they 
have, in turn, set up terrorist camps in Chechnya ... and Gunaratna has found that the 
intelligence agencies of Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Iran 'directly and indirectly 
supported the Chechen guerillas'. " [41] 
Kadyrov's political power likely rests in part on his ability to keep money flowing 
in from Russia. Russia agreed to fund the rebuilding of Chechnya. However, President 
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Kadyrov has a powerful advantage over any would-be competitors. Namely, by his own 
admission, he has killed his political rivals. He seems to have Russia's support and, he 
has the Kadyrovtsy. The Kadyrovtsy are a semi-Constitutional force that answers to 
President Kadyrov. They were created following the death of Ramzan's father Akhmad 
(the first President of the Chechen Republic). They consist of militia originally organized 
by the Kadyrov clan augmented with Russian Special Operations forces. The Kadyrovtsy 
may have participated in the killing of Asian Maskhadov. Their effectiveness may have 
provided the impetus for the redeployment of Russian forces from Chechnya. All of this 
being said none of these provide certainty for Kadyrov. 
Asian Maskhadov and Shamil Baseyev both enjoyed popular support. For a time 
they both had political power within Chechnay. All three men (Asian Maskhadov, 
Shamil Baseyev, and Ramzan Kadyrov) held the equivalent title of First Deputy Prime 
Minister. All three fought the Russians. All three fought for the Soviet Army.8 Chance 
and political guile favored Kadyrov and his father to this point. They became the Russian 
sanctioned separatists. They could use populist appeal against Russian forces while using 
Russian aid against other separatist organizations. Russia picked and supported an 
already well established Chechen clan as their proxy. Their proxy won. Fates turn 
quickly in the Caucasus. Likewise the political undercurrents that determine the state of 
affairs in Russia may not always be apparent. 
In his article for The Independent Patrick Cockburn, drawing from an article 
written by Boris Kagarlitsky, claims that Shamil Baseyev and a senior "Kremlin leader" 
8 The First President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Dzhokhar Dudayev was a Major General in the 
Soviet Air Force. Asian Maskhadov was a Colonel in the Soviet Army. Shamil spent a brief time in the 
Soviet Army but is rumored to have ties to the GRU. 
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pre-arranged the attack on Dagestan and thus the Second Chechen War [42]. Mr. 
Cockburn provides political motivation as the catalyst for the event; a small war would be 
beneficial for Shamil Basayev, Boris Yeltisn and the Russian government at large. 
Cockburn's most telling and relevant point regards the then soon-to-be newly elected 
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, "... that gave Mr. Putin the backing he needed to invade 
Chechnya. An unknown figure when appointed, with just 2 [percent] support in the polls, 
he was soon the leading candidate to win the presidency."[43] This claim is also 
supported by Sergie Stepashin, a former Russian Interior Minister and Prime Minister 
[44]. When the Second Chechen War began Vladimir Putin was the head of the Russian 
Federal Security Service (FSB) and Sergie Stepashin was the Interior Minister. Both men 
were appointed by Boris Yeltsin. If Mr. Stepashin's allegation is accurate then Vladimir 
Putin would have known of the Basayev plan to attack Dagestan. All Russian 
intelligence services, including the GRU, work for the FSB. Additionally, Russian 
Special Operation forces work for the GRU. Recall that Russian Special Operations 
forces are included in the Kadyrovtsy. It is not then unreasonable to assume then that the 
Kremlin has some influence over the Kadyrovtsy. Kremlin policy changes or a 
sufficiently organized local resistance is still a threat to the Kadyrov government. More 
specific to this research is that either event could precipitate the elimination of the current 
government and/or the creation of an Islamist safe-haven in Chechnya. 
As discussed above, the lives and political careers of four men have been 
consumed to create the political career of a fifth. The Second Chechen War began almost 
a year to the day after the Ruble Crisis of 17 August 1998. Conceivably events such as 
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these could happen to Ramzan Kadyrov as well. The global economy is in distress. 
Russia's is worse than most. Estimates call for 45% decline in Russian exports and a 
subsequent 5% slump in Russia's GDP [45]. Islam is on the rise in traditionally Slavic 
Russia [46]. All the while, the ethnic Russian population continues to decrease 
demographically. A conflict against radical Islamists in Chechnya could slow economic 
decline in Russia and rally public sentiment behind the government. It could also slow 
the progression of Islam in Russia. Ramzan has been in power less than two years. With 
the exception of his father, most of the other men lasted about five years. A conflict in 
Chechnya could be beneficial for Russia; and President Kadyrov is still vulnerable. A 
Russian engineered Islamist insurrection in Chechnya could anneal Russian domestic 
support, purportedly as the Second Chechen War did. These events describe another 
incident that puts into motion the events that conclude with the establishment of an 
Islamist safe-haven in Chechnya. These facts lend themselves to the proffered scenario 
modeled in this thesis and discussed in Chapter Three. 
In the context of this thesis, the US could view the appearance of a safe-haven in 
Chechnya as a security threat. As indicated above there are plausible reasons why Russia 
might support the establishment of a safe-haven in Chechnya or be unwilling to act 
against said safe-haven. Russian promises to deal with the perceived threat could be 
deemed unreliable by US policy makers. Thus, US action could be viewed as a necessity. 
Concluding, Chechnya and Afghanistan have been intertwined for the last ten 
years, arguably for the last twenty. In May of 2000 President Putin threatened 
"preventive strikes" on Afghanistan as the result of a meeting between Asian Maskhadov 
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and Osama bin Laden near Mazar-i-Sharif. In the deal between the two men Chechnya 
would receive material and technical assistance from al-Qaeda. It is ironic to note that 
the contrarian US position argued that President Putin would risk Western investment in 
Russia if he attacked Afghanistan over perceived Chechen - Afghan (Taliban) collusion 
[47]. Finally, the author suggests two reasons why Islamists would relocate to Chechnya: 
1) pressure against traditional Islamist safe-havens in the Arabian Peninsula and Central 
Asia, along with historic ties between al-Qaeda, the Taliban and Chechen Islamic 
militants; 2) a political maneuver to create support for Slavic governance in Russia at the 
expense of the Chechens and Russian Muslims. 
3. US - RUSSIAN POLICY PREFERENCES 
The information contained in this section, in part, provides a qualitative 
assessment of US and Russian preferences. These preferences will be used to develop 
the quantitative model in Chapter Three. 
a) Russia 
Economic considerations 
Richard Haass contends that Russia's future is uncertain, the result of a shrinking 
population base and a small GDP to landmass ratio. Russia is substantially larger than 
the US, with a GDP of Brazil [48]. Nikolas Gvosdev argues that this is "an illusion," or 
at least holds little merit [49]. Highlighting this academic disagreement is meant to 
illustrate Russian national challenges. Russia has been twice spurned by Azerbaijani 
hydrocarbon pipeline deals. The BCT pipeline and the BTE pipeline (Figure 3) were 
both built to provide oil and natural gas to European markets. Both pipelines bypass 
45 
Russian territory even thought transiting through Russia would be a shorter. The reserves 
of the Caspian basin could be the third leg in the stool [50]. Thus, as nations look to 
hedge their positions regarding oil imports and exports, the Caucasus nations become a 
point of interest. 
Russia maintains sufficient power in the region to block Western goals locally 
while dramatically raising the cost of any global policy resulting from a regional 
grievance. Russia's power is not limited to military compellence. In this thesis 
compellence is defined as the credible threat of the use-of-force to resolve a conflict 
between two nations. Seventy-five percent of the GDP of post-Soviet states comes from 
or involves Russia [51]. Additionally, as Russia secured its economic independence from 
the West, thanks in part to oil prices, they began to enter into regional/Eastern European 
negotiations with additional clout. Namely, they had money and a fairly set of trading 
partners. 
Figure 3. Map 3 : The BTE and BTC pipelines 
Source: Perry-Castenada Map Collection, The University of Texas, Originally product of 
the United States of America Central Intelligence Agency, 2002 
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Despite the angst associated with regional pipelines, Russia and the US should be 
able to come to an agreement on global issues. Such issues include nuclear weapons non-
proliferation and Islamic extremism. Similarly, compromise on, or the conduct of, joint 
action into the Russian sphere of influence (SOI) should not be precluded. Instability in 
the Caucasus is only acceptable to Russia as long as it is limited and contained. A strong 
Russia shepherding weak Caucasus states is a preferred Russian policy. A corollary to 
that policy is that the West should have limited, if any, involvement in the Caucasus. 
Social considerations - security in the Caucasus and Southern Russia 
Russian policy in the region has been to consolidate power north of the Caucasus 
Mountains in order to provide security in Southern Russia. Terrorism, Islamic 
extremism, and the trafficking of illegal drugs are all concerns of Russia. This national 
policy was first expressed by President Yeltsin in 1995, and it seems to resonate almost 
fifteen years later. Regarding the Caucuses, Russia's concern about its southern border 
goes back much further than 1995, at least two-hundred years prior. This concern is 
characterized as Russia's sense of strategic distance. The concept of strategic distance is 
a way of looking at national security based on geography. It states that events that occur 
closer to the center of Russia are of greater concern than those that are further away. 
Historically Russia's southern and western borders have been the initial fronts in Russian 
wars. Mindful of history these concerns endure. The red ellipse on Map 4 roughly 
locates Chechnya. This map illustrates how relatively close major Russian population 
and industrial centers are to its southern and western borders. 
47 
ltol«] * * . ' / . 
; .** LiTttttM f.;$f / 
*n - - r - ' - : ? : « , " y M i i » k \ • * • * . - • ' " " \ . . . * .. 
„ # W m d w x .. 5, , , 
" > v *PHS"C . * ^ « . i . . . . #K"" ", ,. -... ' S ; $ 
f. Vi.-rrn.i**llMlls!.W,r *1«Ufc1U ,, , . .'. tVi.-^;:*J • Mi,AU R A / A K H S Y A M 
•yju.^ .«>•..«- K,.-nNA * \ ' { i : " , 
'Alt-Mf 
• v^ » *HU.QAIU.; ^Vft l .V ! « » ! « 1 
x.lf.« i l k * « W ' M « . ' r,„ , U . L , , , w n i v « « w « | ,-
r , 
« , * _ • , i ^ , . . . R .n.».. ^WJ.,.10 %.-,.,.,# > *,Vtu' . TliKKMF-MISTAH l.i-hl.m 
• • . wrcC*. - > m , U I K R f V ' . , ^ 
- , t , , - \ ;5^( Ft* Art * 
Figure 4. Map 4 : The Caucasus states 
Source: European Dialogue 
Policy in Europe and Asia 
Increasingly political dividends in Russia are paid to those who pursue a policy of 
estrangement from the West and espouse entrenched self-interest through a unitary, 
global policy of 'What's good for Russia?' And, what's good for Russia is stability and 
predictability along its southern border. While Russia has fought vigorously to maintain 
control of the territory on the north side of the Caucasus it is unlikely that Russia would 
engineer significant unrest to its south [52]. 
Russia's role in regional conflicts may be over-sold particularly the notion that an 
invisible hand is quietly fomenting unrest and conflict in the region. R. Craig Nation 
recognizes that while Russia exerts meaningful control in the region, through "significant 
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policy levers," unrest and instability on Russia's southern border is not in its best interest 
[53]. But, it does provide a fairly unique opportunity for Russia to mold the region to fit 
its own self-interest. Western image and reach has diminished as a result of the wars in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and perceived US policy hypocrisy. In regards to coalitions in general 
and US - Russian relations in specific the author contends two points: 1) regional 
alliances and security treaties based on local issues, common history, and shared ethnic 
origins are easier to establish and maintain than those that are not.9 Simply put, 
perceived momentary common interest enjoys supremacy in the Caucasus; 2) there are 
rational reasons why Russia would oppose any and every US policy regarding the 
Caucasus states. Might Russian concerns of US involvement in the region be why Russia 
is not pursuing the conclusion of the US led wars in Iraq or Afghanistan, or the mending 
of US - Iranian relations? Progress on these fronts would mean that the US would be 
able to turn its attention to Russia [54]. 
Putin and Medvedev have spent considerable effort consolidating political power 
in Central Asia and attempting to subordinate post-Soviet states like Georgia because of 
their interests in the Caucasus and the Caspian [55]. Energy reserves and pipelines play 
an important role in regional economic affairs. The oil and gas that flows from this 
pipeline to the West almost assures the independence and Western goodwill towards the 
states which it runs through. Given this, Russian policy has been to systematically 
increase their control over oil and gas transportation through the Caspian Region [56]. 
9 Consider that Chechens joined Russian soldiers during the Russia - Georgia war, and the unusual U.S. 
Armenia relations. In an area dense with history, relations are cemented on historical events. 
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This requires Russia to hold influence of regional governments. There are ethnic and 
social considerations involved as well. 
In Russia twenty-five percent of the population is not ethnically Russian. It 
includes about thirty million Muslims. As mentioned, Islam has an emergent role in 
Russia, threatening to replace the existing Slavic order in portions of the country. A 
policy authorizing the use of force against Muslims in a former Soviet state could be met 
with significant condemnation be a meaningful portion of the population. 
When determining long-term foreign policy Russia likely realizes that within 
twenty years there will be huge regional changes. China, Russia's geopolitical rival, may 
reach its peak power [57]. And, the population of the region will be very different than it 
is now. More Muslims will live in traditional Slavic regions of central Russia and a 
larger number of Sino-Russo citizens along the Russian - China border. All of this is 
capped off with the remembrance of past grievances that will influence current and future 
Russian foreign policy. 
There is a common belief that the US exploited Russian weakness following the 
break-up of the Soviet Union. While the US was initially very careful not to gloat over a 
perceived Cold War victory, policies towards Russia were not gracious. Russia was 
willing to do whatever was needed to be done in order to maintain support from the US. 
Beginning with Gorbachev, Russians have very strong feelings about Gorbachev. He 
was not liked. He received about one-percent of the popular vote following the breakup 
of the Soviet Union [58]. Next came Boris Yeltsin. In the eyes of many Russians Boris 
Yeltsin was a drunken-fool that sold Russian honor, pride and independence for limited 
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personal and national gains [59]. Concessions made by Yeltsin were followed by more 
demands and increasingly aggressive US foreign policy. Putin is seen as a restoration 
president. He has made it known that Russia believes that contemporary US policy seeks 
to diminish Russian political influence [60]. Brent Scowcroft sums up Russia as: 
"77?e Russian soul is an amalgam of these experiences. Along with their very 
many assets, they can be overly aggressive when they 're strong, and they brutalize other 
people. And, sometimes fawning when they're weak." [61] 
b) United States 
National Security Concerns Regarding Militant Islam 
The dual requirements to secure energy resources and combat Islamic 
fundamentalism are two defining national security concerns for the US. The attacks of 
September 11, 2001 and the increasing global demand for oil place political constraints 
on US strategic decision-making. These two constraints are simultaneously national 
concerns and issues for domestic consideration. 
The author contends that the US perceives an increasingly militant, Muslim 
world. There is unrest in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Success in Iraq is uncertain as is any 
meaningful progress in the Iranian nuclear arms stand-off. These concerns pale in 
comparison to the restrained anarchy that exists in African nations such as Somalia, 
Sudan, and Congo. Security problems abound; and, military force can be a seen as 




The eight years of US President George H.W. Bush witnessed periods of 
cooperation and generally improving relations between the US and former Soviet States 
in both Central Asia and Eastern Europe. With the inclusion of Poland, Romania, and the 
Czech Republic, NATO has reached the border of the Russian Federation. Other former 
Soviet states such as Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan have signaled their 
intention to deepen their involvement in NATO through the Individual Partnership 
Action Plan (IPAP). More recently, the actions of Vice-President Joe Biden between 
April 2009 and October 2009 indicate that these states are seen as the "New Europe" and 
the "New NATO." Specifically, his activities in the area focused on increasing their 
participation in the Afghan War, as well as their acceptance and assistance in a new 
European ballistic missile defense (BMD) shield. His statements in Ukraine explicitly 
refuted Russian hegemony in Eastern Europe and to a lesser extent Central Asia [62]. 
While the US attempts to counter Russian policies and maximize their national 
benefits, Russia does the same. US involvement in the Caucasus could bring increased 
stability in the region. Similarly, US investment in the region could help diversify 
monolithic economies. But, while stability is good for Russia, a decrease in regional 
power is viewed as a disadvantage. Negotiated joint action could limit expenses for both 
states but it would also limit any political or economic gains for either nation. The 
establishment of an Islamist safe-haven in Chechnya presents a problem for both nations. 
Both nations' security is threatened by the existence of the safe-haven thus, military 
action to remove the threat could be appealing. However, the US and Russia have to 
consider the decisions of the other. For Russia, would the US accept Russian assurances 
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that the threat would be dealt with appropriately? Would the US attempt to re-make the 
region once they had invested American blood and treasure in a Chechen conflict? For 
the US, could Russia blunt US power by allowing the existence of a safe-haven in 
Chechnya? A negotiated US - Russian policy of joint action could be a diplomatic and 
foreign policy success. But, it could also become a practical failure. These decisions can 
be modeled and analyzed using Game Theory. 
4. THE QUANTITATIVE METHODOLOGY: INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 
a) Game Theory 
Game Theory was developed by John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in 
1944. The resulting publication was Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Game 
Theory uses probability theory and other forms of applied mathematics to determine 
reasonable decision solutions. Game Theory has long been used by economists to model 
buyer - seller completion in mirco-economics. An important concept in Game Theory is 
the requirement that two (or more) individuals or coalition groups are in competition for 
some 'thing', generally referred to as the payoff. Payoffs can be tangible or intangible. 
Essentials of Game Theory 
For the purposes of this thesis the author defines the essentials of Game Theory as 







In Game Theory two players, or two coalition groups, vie for control of some 
finite asset. In political games two politicians compete for votes or campaign financing. 
In economic games two corporations compete for market share or consumer loyalty. 
Players expect to receive a payoff based on the combination of their decisions and the 
decisions of their competitor. All players have a preference. A player's preference 
assigns rank-order to the outcomes of the game. When payoffs are quantifiable and in 
familiar units, then assigning preference is not difficult, rational players prefer $100 to 
$10. Tangible payoffs are often quantified in utils. However, when the payoff is 
intangible, or when payoffs have a value based on the specific beliefs of the players, then 
it is more difficult to compute payoffs. In this instance preference is used to determine a 
choice. 
Consider a game composed of two players, defined as [A,B], competing over 
draws from a box of donuts. The box of donuts is a set D = [glazed, chocolate, blueberry, 
maple-frosted]. Preferences are ordered (A, B) 3l > 2 > 3 > 4. Each player's preference 
is a functional mapping that attaches their individual preference to a specific donut. 
/A = [ (1, chocolate), (2, blueberry), (3, maple-frosted), (4, glazed) ] 
/ B = [ (1, chocolate), (2, maple-frosted), (3, blueberry), (4, glazed) ] 
The utils are the integer value associated with the mapping. Player A prefers 
chocolate over all others (1). Glazed donuts are the least preferred (4). In this specific 
case the payoff utils are equivalently spaced integer values, where smaller is better. This 
is not a requirement, and is actually a simplification of Game Theory. 
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A game can be expressed in two ways. The traditional version is referred to as 
the normal form. The normal form is a tabulated expression of choices and payoffs. The 
other form is the extensive or strategic form. This form lends itself to decision analysis 
as it views any decision as the result of previous decisions. This sequence of decisions 
produces a game tree. Extensive form games are inherently sequential games. Normal 
form games are simultaneous and exist to predict, or explain, a single decision. 
Extensive form games use branches and nodes to describe movement within the decision 
space. As mentioned this is referred to as the game tree. 
A node denotes a decision and branches transition the players between nodes. 
Conceptually nodes are decision points. Branches equate to time and consideration prior 
to the next decision; they move players between nodes (decision points). A central 
theory in Game Theory is the existence of equilibrium points. 
Equilibrium points, commonly Nash Equilibrium points, are the pair of decision 
that provides the best payoff to each player such that they could not do better by 
themselves. And, since players are assumed rational they will make the choice that suits 
them best, then a Nash Equilibrium is the solution to the game. Mathematician John 
Nash proved mathematically that there is a solution for every game.10 An advantage of 
Game Theory is that it examines the interaction of two decision-makers that understand 
that their payoff is linked to the decision made by their competitor. Thus, solutions to 
games can be less than optimal while still being an equilibrium point. In this instance the 
conflicting choices limits payoff to both players. 
Nash allows the use of mixed strategies, decision by dice, as well as pure preferential strategies. 
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Sequential versus simultaneous games 
This thesis uses an extensive form, sequential game referred to as the 
International Interaction game. The thesis will also borrow concepts from other games 
[63]. As such other forms will be described succinctly. 
A sequential game is simply a series of games played by the same group of 
players. A sequential game can describe the marketing and strategic business 
management practices of Coca-Cola and Pepsi. In sequential games new information is 
brought into each subsequent game. These games allow for learning, cooperation, 
communication, under-table deals and coercion [64]. A simultaneous game is a game in 
which both players choose a course of action simultaneously. 
A game can be repeated but it is either simultaneous or it is sequential. In 
simultaneous games players choose a course of action at the same time and there is no 
priori. In sequential games there is a priori, knowledge of events before the required 
decision. In sequential games the game is started by a move-by Nature, a chance event. 
This move then precipitates the move of one of the players, say player ,4. Player B then 
reacts to player ,4. The decisions cascade down the extensive form game, the game tree, 
until they reach the end-game and payoff. Sequential games can be either zero-sum or 
non-zero-sum games. 
Zero-sum and Non-zero-sum games 
In a zero-sum game the winner takes all. One player gains while the other loses. 
In a non-zero sum game while there is a relationship between payoff and success, that 
relationship is not binary. In fact, in a non-zero sum game both players can lose. Non-
56 
zero sum games are generally more complicated and include more rules, such as the 
allowance for communication, agreements, order of play and information. 
Communication 
Communication allows informed decision-making. Communication is not always 
beneficial. Communication can be used to coerce, limit decisions, or provide deceptive 
information. Communication is involved in learning. In a repeated or sequential game 
communication between the players can add context to the data being presented. 
Agreements and side payments 
Agreements and side payments are important because they directly influence 
payoff values and decision logic. Side payments act to reinforce the payoff. A payoff of 
x might be reinforced by a side payment of y. In this example an individual's payoff may 
be of such value that he is willing to compensate his competitor, who realizes that he has 
more to gain from cooperation than conflict. 
Agreements limit decisions. Agreements can also reduce payoff. Reneging on a 
contractual agreement might provide increased capability. But, that capability is 
constrained by losses associated with the breach of contract. Consider the value of the 
solution space to be 2X. Two players [A,B] split the space equally such that their payoffs 
are: A = X and B = X. The division of the solution was negotiated so that each player 
receives half of the solution. A superior organization has the ability to punish the players 
from deviation. If A violates the contract he might receive X+Y, his original payoff plus a 
fractional amount to B's. But, he will also be punished (by amount = Z). So, as long Z > 
Fit is unwise to break the negotiated settlement. This is a simplistic example, but it is 
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one that illustrates why political figures and nation states are rarely able to get what they 
want through consensus. The individual, or state, is in the middle of competing interests. 
A modern political version of this dilemma is the Watergate scandal, and the court case 
United States v. Nixon [65]. In this instance the break-in and wire-taps are the 
"agreement" - or the breaking there of. The decision to release the White House Tapes is 
a subsequent game, as shown in The Presidential Election Game, and is predicated by the 
initial action. 
Order of play 
Most games begin with a move by Nature, a chance event that initiates the game. 
Order of play becomes important when games are not simultaneous. 
The first move is beneficial in a single-play game. The player with the first move 
can make certain he attains the value of the game, and in effect, force the hand of the 
second player. In repeated or sequential games the player with the first move reveals his 
strategy. The initial move can indicate a player's level of risk tolerance. Additionally, 
while the first move favors aggressive behavior the second move encourages punishment. 
An aggressive player can be punished by the other at the second move. 
The Theory of Moves by Brams differs from traditional Game Theory in that 
players are expected to update their preferences while the game is being played. This 
general concept will be included in the thesis model. Specifically, a game is viewed as a 
series of interactions that occur in a sequential order. Players calculate their payoff by 
summing the immediate and longer-term value associated with their decisions. This 
technique lends itself to the extensive form and to the International Interaction Game. 
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Information 
Information can be bane or boon. Information about another player's preference 
can make the other player susceptible to limiting strategies, threats [66] and 
complications associated with escalation, compellence and deterrence [67]. A deluge of 
information can diminish certainty. The converse is also true, sequestered decision-
makers can be steered towards a decision based on the information they are provided, or 
the information that is blocked. 
b) Contemporary Game Theory 
There is an abundance of literary material on Game Theory, and its application in 
the study of international relations. Three contributions important to this research are 
cited below. These concepts will be included in the thesis model. 
Domestic considerations —factors in international policy 
In this category the foremost concept is - domestic considerations play a role in 
international policy decisions. Politicians are constrained by their constituents. This is a 
reasonable statement for all but the most dictatorial regimes. Domestic policy influences 
foreign policy-making, the strict Realpolitik theory does not do an adequate job 
predicting future conflict, or explaining historical conflagrations [68]. Nations are 
composed of people from various ethnic and cultural origins. The norms, values and 
beliefs of a culture affect how that culture weights preferences, communicates and 
cooperates [69]. These small, individual biases are tiny perturbations that sum up to 
create a meaningful political force. This is the driving force behind suspicion and the 
fear of exploitation. Competing nations may believe that their opponent is willing to risk 
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conflict in order to pursue an advantage through exploitation during a negotiation. Thus, 
through fear of exploitation the dove is willing to bet on a chance outcome (armed 
conflict) over the sure exploitation (negotiation) of their aggressive competitor [70]. 
Domestic political support for an issue, its salience, is linked to national values and the 
perception of global realities. The politician's challenge then is to address the problem 
at-hand and through the crafting policies that are agreeable to the median voter. Median 
voter salience can be viewed by a distribution curve. 
Feelings about a particular issue can be plotted as a distribution curve. Voter 
preference, or issue salience, is the dependent variable. The median position for a normal 
distribution of 100 samples is 50. The politician that aligns himself at the median 
position will receive 50% of the political payoff, while having an even chance at some 
remainder value [71]. Even in this simplified example, it is easy to see why political 
polling has become ubiquitous. Individual (voter) decisions are aggregated, manipulated 
and turned into new information to support national level decisions. 
Use of force and considerations of national dominance 
Capitulation has a known cost; it is a loss, there is no possibility of winning. 
Acquiescence is probabilistic. Acquiescing provides a probability for some gain. 
Negotiation and conflict have probabilistic costs. The status quo can be preferential 
middle-ground [72]. When the status quo is no longer preferred, negotiation is preferred 
over conflict. The key consideration in making a decision is - do the benefits outweigh 
the costs? 
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There are costs associated with military action; but success in a military endeavor 
can prove beneficial. Chance and uncertainty are hallmarks of war; a rough equation 
governing conflict can be written as: PXWar831") > (l-P')(Warloss). This equation 
expresses that the product of the probability of success (P1) for nation (/) and its 
associated gain (War831") must be greater than the product of the probability of failure (1-
P1) and the cost of failure (WarIoss). A conflict for (i) is beneficial if the probable benefits 
out-weight the probable costs. Numerous factors combine to create the cost of conflict. 
Four factors are presented in War and Reason: a, x, y and §.11 All of these rules, in part, 
form the seven assumptions that are used to establish the International Interaction Game. 
These assumptions are affected by reality. Assumption 4 from War and Reason, 
states that nations prefer to negotiate over initiating a war. There are costs and benefits 
associated with conflict. Combine these beliefs with the Assumption 6, and defining 
costs to the target (T) > costs to the attacker (a), it is possible to imagine instances where 
war is preferable to either the status quo or negotiation. This is proven numerous times 
under various conditions in War and Reason; it is the Basic War Theorem [73]. 
Policy formulation and rational decisions 
The thesis defines rational in the common vernacular, in a pragmatic way. As 
presented in the European Community Decision-Making Model, the thesis uses rational to 
mean a subjective expected utility maximizing [74]. There is a nuanced difference 
between this interpretation and that defined by Luce [75] and commonly used in Game 
11 a is the cost to the attacker for fighting away; T is the cost the defender pays as the target of the attack, y 
is the cost to the states that capitulates and (j) is the domestic political cost of going to war. This is 
assumption number six, of the seven assumptions required in international interaction game. 
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Theory and Agent-Based modeling. The latter does not explicitly consider the actions of 
other actors, agents, or opponents. A rational decision is informed by subjective expected 
gains and perceived risk. Strategic decision-makers are rational actors. 
That nations participate in conflicts is indication enough that decision-making is 
flawed. Human dimensions matter. Personalities, errors, bad choices and chance play a 
role in decision-making and the visible outcome of policy decisions [76] 
The International Interaction Game 
The International Interaction Game was developed by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita 
in War and Reason. It is a sequential, extensive form game in which two players, 
national leaders for competing nations, make a series of decisions to redress a mutual 
grievance. There are eight possible outcomes to the game and a single equilibrium point. 
Each subsequent decision allows leaders to escalate or de-escalate. Each leader has a 
preference list that describes their degree of satisfaction for each of the eight outcomes. 
The outcomes are a set of thirteen: capitulation, acquiesce, status quo, negotiation and, 
war. The leaders have a sense of history and their own beliefs about their competitors 
preferential ordering of the thirteen outcomes (Figure 5). 
62 
CAPB WARA CAPA WARB 
Figure 5. The International Interaction Game (1 of 2) 
Source: War and Reason. 
The first move belongs to player/leader A. Player A can demand (D4) or not-
demand (-D4). Assuming that player^ makes a demand (D4) of 2? advances the game to 
node 3. At node 3 player B can issue a counter-demand (DB) or not-demand (-D8), in 
which case the game ends with the acquiescence of player B to player A If player B 
issues a counter-demand the game advances to node 5 and player A can chose to use-
force (F4) or not-use-force (-F4). Once the flow of the Game is understood it is 
important to: 1) clarify assumptions made regarding the International Interaction Game 
and; 2) define the various payoff terms and subsequently adapt the International 
Interaction Game for use in this thesis. 
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Seven assumptions govern the International Interaction Game. In general these 
assumptions constrain a leader's preference. Leaders prefer negotiation to war, and, their 
own acquiescence to capitulation. Capitulation has a known cost and results when a 
nation concedes to the demands of the other after being attacked. But, consider that a 
nation that capitulates loses 100% of the time; and, a capitulation reorders relations 
between the two nations. On the contrary Acquiescence has a probabilistic cost and 
results when a nation "gives-in without a fight"; they concede to the initial demand. But 
nations that acquiesce maintain the international order. They chose a course of action 
rather than being forced into one through military defeat. 
Finally, leaders prefer the acquiescence of their competitor to a negotiated) 
settlement. Their competitor bends to their will without a counter-demand. These 
preferential orderings exist because negotiation and acquiescence result in probabilistic 
payoffs/costs and nations prefer to settle their grievances without armed conflict [77]. 
Five adaptations will be applied to this basic Game Theory model to develop the Thesis 
Game Tree model. The Thesis Game Tree model will be solved; later is will be extended 
and simulated, incorporation concepts from War and Reason and other attributed to the 
author. 
In summary, this chapter has presented the case for the immigration of radical 
Islamists from the Arabian Peninsula to the Caucasus, specifically to Chechnya. It has 
also detailed US and Russian policy in the Caucasus region and some of their historical 
animosities. This description included examining the evolution of their respective 
national security strategies and policies regarding Islamists, in Central Asia, and the 
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Caucasus. Finally, this chapter discussed Game Theory in general and the International 
Interaction Game in specific. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
DEVELOPING THE COMPUTATIONAL MODEL 
This chapter of the thesis extends the qualitative research by providing a 
quantitative model to examine US and Russian policy decision-making. The quantitative 
model developed for this thesis, referred to as the Thesis Game Tree, is an extensive form 
Game Theory model. The Thesis Game Tree is based on the International Interaction 
Game created by Bueno de Mesquita in War and Reason. This thesis adapts the 
International Interaction Game in numerous ways. This chapter will describe the 
quantitative method from a procedural stand-point. And, it will define terms specific to 
the methodology. First, the term "outcome": an outcome is the conclusion of a conflict at 
which point the US and Russia receive a payoff. That being said the first step in model 
creation is to express US and Russian preferences as a range of values from a to b or [a, 
b] (inclusive), with a representing the lower bound and b representing the upper bound. 
This feature is unique to the Thesis Game Tree model. Strict ordinal preferences were 
used in War and Reason. This adaptation models a decision-maker's uncertainty 
regarding a payoff as it pertains to a specific decision. "Uncertainty" is defined as the 
inability to fix a value to a variable. In this instance, the US prefers certain outcomes 
over others; and, it establishes these preferences based on their subjective expected 
utility. However, the US cannot know the exact payoff of a policy. They can only be 
certain that the payoff value falls within a specified range, as mentioned [a, bj. After 
model creation, a simulation will be engaged to present numerous instances of the model, 
specifically a Monte Carlo simulation. A random number will be generated and 
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subsequently mapped to its appropriate range as defined in this chapter. These values 
will then be applied to the Thesis Game Tree. Once applied, the Thesis Game Tree will 
be solved through backwards induction. The results of repeated independent simulations 
will be reported in Chapter 4. The following details a review of player preferences. 
Recall that preferences are measured in a unit-less value referred to as a util. A 
player's preference is a subjective assessment of value. Preferences are used when 
quantifiable values cannot be assigned to an outcome, or when doing so would be 
inappropriate. This models uncertainty in decision-making. For instance, $10 has a 
greater value than $1. Given "$10 or $1" option the appropriate response is to choose 
$10. This action is referred to as maximizing payoff. However, if an unknown amount of 
money is stuffed into two envelopes, one large and the other small, the appropriate 
preferential response is to choose the larger envelope. The larger envelope can hold more 
money thus increasing the possibility of a larger payoff. A lottery has an uncertain value. 
An expected value can be determined. This is done for the Thesis Game Tree, later 
within the chapter. 
Section 1. of this chapter examines the International Interaction Game and 
illuminates the researcher's adaptations to it. In section II., US and Russian payoff 
preferences are determined. The second section will conclude with a discussion on the 
assumptions required to implement the Game. The 7 - Assumptions are borrowed from 
War and Reason, but clarification regarding their use in this thesis is provided. The third 
section examines the preferences in detail by linking the quantitative preferences with 
information from the qualitative research. The natural outcome of this process is a 
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"what-if', a scenario that illustrates possible choices and their outcomes. With 
assumptions and preferences in-hand, a plausible solution to the "what-if scenario is 
provided in Section 3. This plausible solution will be accompanied by an explanation as 
to why these decisions might occur. This explanation is informed by the literature and 
based on the structure of the model. Section 4. describes the creation of the simulation in 
more detail. 
1. ADAPTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL INTERACTION GAME 
The International Interaction Game models the decision-making that occurs 
between two leaders (individuals or possibly coalitions) during a conflict. Rational 
players (leaders) have ordered outcome preferences. Their preferences drive their 
decision-making. In the International Interaction Game policy decisions (branches) 
escalate the conflict to a shared end-state (node) at the conclusion of the game. Both the 
International Interaction Game, and adaptations to it, are discussed in the following 
section. 
a) The International Interaction Game 
The International Interaction Game was developed by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita 
in War and Reason. It is a sequential, extensive form game in which two players, 
national leaders for competing nations, make a series of decisions to redress a mutual 
grievance. There are thirteen possible outcomes to the game and at least one equilibrium 
point when using pure strategies. Each decision provides leaders (players) the ability to 
escalate or deescalate the conflict. Each leader has a preference list that describes his 
degree of satisfaction for each of the outcomes. The outcomes are a set of thirteen drawn 
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from the five choices: capitulation, acquiesce, status quo, negotiation and, war. The 
leaders have a sense of history and their own beliefs about their competitors preferential 
ordering of the thirteen outcomes (Figure 6). 
CAPB WARA CAPA WARB 
Figure 6. The International Interaction Game (2 of 2) 
Source: War and Reason. 
The first move belongs to player/leader A. Player A can demand (D4) or not-
demand (-D4). Assuming that player ,4 makes a demand (D4) of U, this move advances 
the game to node 3. At node 3 player B can issue a counter-demand {DB) or not-demand 
(-D8), in which case the game ends with the acquiescence of player B to player ,4. If 
player B issues a counter-demand the game advances to node 5 and player A can chose to 
use-force (F4) or not-use-force (-F4). Once the flow of the Game is understood it is 
important to: 1) clarify assumptions made regarding the International Interaction Game 
and; 2) define the various payoff terms and subsequently adapt the International 
Interaction Game for use in this thesis. 
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The 7 - Assumptions from the International Interaction Game govern this model. 
In general these assumptions constrain a leader's preference. Leaders prefer negotiation 
to war, and, their own capitulation to acquiescence. Capitulation has a known cost and 
results when a nation concedes to the demands of the other after being attacked. 
Acquiescence has a probabilistic cost and results when a nation "gives-in" without a 
fight; they concede to the initial demand. Finally, leaders prefer the acquiescence of their 
competitor to a negotiate(d) settlement. In this instance their competitor bends to their 
will without a counter-demand. These preferential orderings exist because negotiation 
and acquiescence result in probabilistic payoffs/costs and nations prefer to settle their 
grievances without armed conflict [1]. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2 negotiation is preferred to war. In the general form of 
the game a negotiated settlement exists as the equilibrium point. This is referred to as the 
Cooperation Proposition 4-1 [2]. This occurs when both leaders prefer a negotiation to 
coercion; and, at least one leader prefers negotiation to the status quo. That being said, 
war can be an equilibrium point given certain additional constraints. This is established 
by the Basic War Theorem (Domestic Proposition 3-1) [3]. This can occur when a nation 
fears being exploited during a negotiation; and, it believes that its opponent prefers war 
to acquiescence. These beliefs re-order preferences, or change payoff values. One 
consideration is that the initiation of a war provides a first-strike advantage.12 The first-
12 History is replete with examples of nations attempting a decisive victory borne of the first-strike 
advantage. In both world wars Germany believed that a first strike would allow it to acquire land and sue 
for peace. Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor was "politics by other means", frustrated by use policy Japan 
attacked hoping to cripple US naval capability and change US policy. The Six Day War is an example of a 
preemptive first-strike. A popular example from ancient history is the Peloponnesian War wherein Sparta 
chose to declare war on Athens as opposed to being outflanked and with diminished influence. 
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strike advantage decreases the expected cost of the conflict because opening stages of the 
military campaign will likely not be waged on the initiators home soil. The following is 
an examination of the payoff terms and an introduction to the adapted International 
Interaction Game developed for the purposes of this thesis. 
b) Payoff terms and initial adaptation of the International Interaction Game 
As mentioned earlier, the outcomes are a set of thirteen, they are: capitulation and 
acquiescence by either side. There is the possibility of a negotiation and the maintenance 
of the status quo. The remaining outcomes are conflict outcomes initiated by either side 
against the other. The author has chosen to replace the war1 outcome with conflict1. This 
is the first adaptation of the International Interaction Game. The reasons for this will be 
explained later. The outcomes are defined as: 
SQ - the maintenance of the status quo. This cost/payoff is regarded as known. 
An otherwise beneficial status quo can be upset by a perceived need for action even in 
situations in which benefits are not assured nor threats imminent. 
ACQ^ussm, ACQUS - the acquiescence of the nation as indicated by the superscript. 
The cost of this decision is regarded as known, or more aptly knowable. Any probability 
associated with the cost/payoff is minimal. 
NEG - the decision to pursue a negotiated settlement. Negotiations are 
contentious. Payoffs from negotiated settlements can vary significantly, possibly having 
less value than the status quo. A notable historical illustration of this contention is Jay's 
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Treaty (of 1794).13 Negotiations have a probabilistic cost/payoff. In negotiations payoff 
is conserved; both players cannot gain more than the value of the status quo.14 
CAP*™81", CAPUS - the capitulation of a nation to the other, where the capitulating 
nation is indicated by the superscript. This is the least preferred outcome for a nation. 
ConflictRussm, Conflictus - the initiation of a conflict by the nation in superscript. 
A conflict does not have to be armed, nor does it have to escalate to a declaration 
of war. Weapons of conflict can include any instrument of national power.15 In this 
research military (US) and diplomatic (Russian) instruments are believed to be the most 
likely. This concept is built into the payoff structure. The US prefers: ConflictRmsia > 
ACQUS > CAPUS. This expresses the US belief that a US - Russian conflict will not 
escalate to an armed military conflict between the two nations. There are additional 
beliefs expressed in the preferences. The following explains these preferences. 
2. NATIONAL PREFERENCES (US AND RUSSIA) 
National policy preferences coalesce around national values, culture and social 
norms. In this way the outcome preferences for any two nations will be dissimilar. Some 
nations, like Sweden and Ireland, maintain a policy of neutrality and are unlikely 
combatants when compared to their regional counterparts not to mention others in the 
13 Supreme Court Chief-Justice John Jay negotiated a treaty between the United States and Britain in 1794. 
The treaty was extremely unpopular. The major US benefit from the treaty was that the US was not drawn 
into the French Revolutionary Wars (1792-1802). 
14 In War and Reason, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita allows for a synergistic SQ payoff, this is referred to as 
policy harmonization (Cooperation Proposition 4.2). This is an agreement where neither player sacrifices. 
This proposition supports negotiated outcomes in political impasses such that negotiation is preferred over 
the SQ, and better than forcing capitulation. 
15 The commonly accepted instruments of national power include: diplomacy, information, military and 
economic. Collectively they are referred to by the acronym DIME. 
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international community. Others have a realists view of war, expressed in the oft quoted 
Clausewitz, "... a continuance of politics by other means". 
a) Preferences - qualitative interpretation 
The two enumerations below provide the ordered outcome preferences for each 
nation. This is the second adaptation of the International Interaction Game. The 
preferences for player B (Russia) match those outlined in War and Reason; but the 
preferences for player A, the US, differ slightly [4]. In War and Reason player A prefers 
CAP4 > War8. This is not the case for the thesis, as illustrated below. The implications 
of this will be discussed in II. A. 1 and II.A.2. 
The qualitative preferences assigned to the US are: 
A C Q R u s s i a > C A p Russ ia > N £ G > C o n f l i c t U S > g Q > C o n f l i c t R u s s i a > A C Q U S > C A p U S 
The qualitative preferences assigned to Russia are: 
ACQUS > SQ > CAPUS > NEG > ConflictRussia > ACQRussia > Conflict"5 > CAPRussia 
These qualitative preferences are mapped into eight subsets of a single superset 
[0, 100]. An ordered enumeration of the outcomes and their respective payoff ranges are 
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Figure 7. Thesis Game Tree with outcome sub-set payoff ranges 
Source: by the author 
Later, the mean value of each outcome payoff ranges will be computed and 
assigned to that particular outcome within the Thesis Game Tree. Subsequently, the 
game can be solved by-hand. Prior to that, further explanation of the qualitative 
preferences for the two nations will be provided. The following narrative describing the 
national preferences was determined by the author following an analysis of the qualitative 




US preferences indicate a hesitance to compromise on issues regarding the threat 
of radical Islam. Specific to the status quo (SQ) Zbigniew Brzezinski is quoted as 
stating, "... the status quo was killing us" [5]. The US prefers negotiation to conflict but, 
is unwilling to accept the status quo of an Islamist safe-haven in Chechnya. Recall that 
from the US perspective: NEG > ConflictRussia > ACQUS > CAPUS. Acquiescence and 
capitulation by Russia might harm long term relations with Russia. But, it could also 
bolster US political power regionally and globally. A successful, (US) favorable 
diplomatic outcome (NEG) to this crisis could provide a net gain in US domestic capital. 
However, US - Russian negotiations have not been beneficial to the US in recent history. 
This is modeled by the relatively large degree of uncertainty regarding the US payoff, as 
expressed by the difference between the upper and lower bounds to that payoff range. 
Likewise, though NEG is strictly preferred to conflict an examination of the payoff ranges 
for these outcomes reveals that it is not preferred by much, as measured by the median 
value. Probabilistic outcome values allow for chance instances in which the US prefers 
conflict to NEG. Consider that the current administration has given much to Russia, but 
has received little in return; at least this is the current domestic consensus.16 When 
considering the two Conflict outcomes, a conflict initiated by the US (Conflictus), a 
limited US military operation targeted at the Islamist safe-haven in Chechnya could be 
"cheap", final and achieve the same strategic ends as that of a drawn-out negotiation. 
16 The US has decided to forego a European missile defense shield, a decision that pleased Vladimir Putin 
but angered many Americans and the nations of Poland and Czech Republic. The Obama administration 
has agreed to allow Russian weapons inspectors' access to US nuclear weapons. Finally, Russian support 
for tough sanctions against Iran appears to be uncertain (as of 20 October 2009). Russian diplomats have 
characterized these discussions as "counter- productive". 
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And, then there is a Conflict ussw outcome. In this outcome the Russian government 
initiates a second "Cold War," possibly by sponsoring the Islamists in Chechnya. In 
either case of conflict, the US does not believe the conflict will escalate to armed military 
conflict. 
Russian Preferences 
Russia indicates a preference for the status quo over most other outcomes. If the 
US does not make a demand Russia will choose to maintain the status quo. Examining 
the payoffs, Russia prefers only ACQUS over SQ. Russia just ended its almost fifteen 
year military operation in Chechnya in April 2009. The author contends that Russia is 
looking for a period of relative peace. A capitulation by the US (CAPUS) might come 
with political gains; but it is likely that these gains will be accompanied by real, tangible 
costs. Next, a negotiation (NEG) could provide for joint US - Russian action. But, it 
would include Russian guarantees and Russian action based on the condition that the US 
not involve itself in Russia's sphere of influence (SOI). A conflict outcome can be 
beneficial for Russia. And, as will be shown later, the model allows for instances where 
Conflict^ [5, 35] is preferable to ConflictRussia [15, 65]. 
The initiation of a Russian conflict at node 12 is defensive, intended to preclude 
future US operations in the Caucasus. In this scenario when Russia issues a counter-
demand (D8) the US decides not to escalate and use-force (~F* off of node 5). At node 9 
Russia escalates (FB), moving the game to node 12. This could be the aforementioned 
"Cold War" scenario, a situation in which Russia decides to support Islamists in 
Chechnya to prevent, or foil, a US military operation in Chechnya. This could have the 
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added benefit of limiting Islamist attacks into Russia. Would the Islamists "bite the hand 
the feeds them"? This places the US in the position of deliberating over two difficult 
options: inaction and possible attack; or action and a potential conflict with Russia. A 
Russian acquiescence (ACQ**"™'") takes the form of Russian military action against the 
Islamists in Chechnya. Russian acquiescence (ACQ^uss,a) to US demands (D4) for 
meaningful action against the threat has a probabilistic cost. A costly war could entangle 
Russia in an unpopular war in Chechnya - again. Worse yet, it would be at the behest of 
the US. Least preferred is Russian capitulation. When examining Russia's last three 
outcomes (CAP*"™", Conflict^, ACQ*"™1") it is helpful to consider that only recently has 
Russia begun to play a larger role in global affairs. As little as four years ago Russian 
considerations were disregarded out-of-hand by the US. Russia does not want to go 
backward; it has taken many years for Russia to rebuild its position in the international 
community since the fall of the USSR [6]. 
Although this thesis relies heavily on the work done by Bueno de Mesquita in 
War and Reason, this model contains numerous departures from the International 
Interaction Game. Notably the Thesis Game Tree uses probabilistic payoffs. Below is a 
review of three other adaptations to the International Interaction Game and some 
generalizations about the Thesis Game Tree. 
First, the War1 outcomes from the International Interaction Game have been 
changed. To reduce confusion they will be referred to as Conflict1, a conflict initiated by 
"I". The conflict outcome, in real terms, is the actual use of force or the beginning of a 
second Cold War. The author contends that it is unreasonable to expect that Russia 
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would attack the US in this scenario; this belief is reflected in the payoff structure. For 
instance, the Conflic^ussia outcome of node 12 is more akin to the Cold War between the 
periods 1947 to 1979, again it does not suggest a Russian invasion of either the US or 
Europe. Additionally, use-of-force needs to be clarified. 
The use of force, or the F1 branches in the International Interaction Game, equates 
to the use of an instrument of national power by one nation to compel the action of the 
other. For this research force includes such strategic events as aggressive troop 
movement or similar policy actions. Thus, the deployment of a US airborne division to 
Azerbaijan is defined as a use-of-force (UOF), as would tacit Russian approval of 
Islamists in Chechnya. A policy of compellence, the credible threat of actual UOF, is 
included as a UOF. Second, this thesis explicitly uses the domestic version of the 
International Interaction Game. In this version of the International Interaction Game 
leaders (players) consider the will of their constituents. This valuation of public will is 
expressed as domestic political capital. Leaders gain or lose domestic political capital as 
a result of the decisions they make. Second, the Thesis Game Tree attaches a range of 
outcome payoff values to specific policy outcomes as opposed to assigning strict ordinal 
preference, or value. The structure and payoffs of the model creates the following 
conditions. 
Initially the left-side (non-violent) of the International Interaction Game is 
included in this thesis. Because of outcome payoff ranges for the US and Russia, 
progress down this branch of the game is less probable than down the right-side (violent). 
This is a result of the US preference of: Conflict > SQ and Russia's proclivity for the 
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status quo. Specifically, an Islamist safe-haven in Chechnya is regarded as a threat to US 
national security; and, action must be taken. From the Russian perspective a threatening 
Islamist safe-haven in Chechnya is not new. But, US operations and long-term presence 
in Chechnya could be more damaging to Russia than the SQ. The second generalization 
regards conflict and NEG. 
The third adaptation is that the US does not prefer CAPUS to ConflictRussia. This is 
a change from War and Reason. And, as mentioned this preference reflects the US belief 
that Russia will risk an armed military conflict over US operations against the Islamist 
safe-haven in Chechnya. A negotiation following along the non-violent left-branch 
appears improbable. But, it appears probable following along the violent right-branch. 
The US payoff ranges between NEG [40, 80] and Conflict [30, 70], illuminate instances 
where Conflict^ could be valued over NEG. 
In the next section the preferences will be mapped to sub-sets of a power set 
[1,100]. The value for each payoff, as perceived by the US and Russia, exists as a payoff 
range with a minimum value, median value and a maximum value. These sub-sets 
intersect, thus a value can be shared between numerous outcomes. For example, from 
Russia's position a "good" Conflict can be of equal (or greater) value when compared 
to a.AC^ussla. This goes against the strict ordinal preferences defined in War and 
Reason and many Game Theory models. As such this models uncertainty and is the third 
adaptation to the International Interaction Game. 
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b) Preferences - quantitative representation 
The qualitative preferences are completely enumerated by the thirteen outcomes 
(Ox). Eight of the thirteen outcomes are unique. All of the outcomes are bounded 
intervals which are a subset of the larger set of values [0,100]. For example, the US's 
perception of ACQ*"™" is represented as [80, 100] e [0,100]. Some of the subsets 
overlap. This overlap allows for set intersection and the possibility of outcomes with 
equivalent payoff. The set mapping from qualitative preference to quantitative value is a 
surjection. Every element of the domain (preferences) maps to at least one element of the 
range (outcome payoff value). 
In summary, the value of any payoff is defined between zero and one-hundred 
inclusive. This value exists in a given range of continuous real numbers, and is contained 
in a bounded set; member elements (values) can be shared between multiple sets, an 
intersection of two sets. The collection of these sets is complete, forming another set, the 
power set. 
The relationship between outcomes payoffs is a natural, representative expression 
of payoffs associated with complicated decisions. Payoffs are expressed as a subset of 
the set [0,100]; they have a payoff range as opposed to a unique value. Since intersection 
is allowed there exists the possibility of payoff equivalency among different decisions. 
The preferences' for the two nations are defined quantitatively as: 
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P U S Preferences 
ACQRuss,a _^ [80> 1 0 0 ] 
CAPRussia->[75,90] 
NEG ->[40, 80] 
Conflictus -> [30, 70] 
SQ -» [30, 40] 
ConflictRussia->[10,25] 
ACQUS -> [5, 10] 
CAPUS -> [0, 5] 
2.) Russian Preferences 
ACQus->[90, 100] 
SQ -> [70, 90] 
CAPUS -> [60, 85] 
NEG -> [40, 75] 
ConflictRuss,a^[15,45] 
ACQRussia->[10,25] 
Conflictus -> [6, 35] 
CApRussia _^ [0> 5 ] 
The preferential range for these subsets is derived and attached to the Thesis 
Game Tree (Figure 8). Payoffs to the US are expressed above the payoffs to Russia. 
And, red nodes are Russian decision nodes; blue nodes are US decision nodes. 
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Figure 8. Thesis Game Tree with preferential outcome value ranges 
Source: by the author 
A decision maker assumes that the midpoint is the expected value of the 
probabilistic interval, and thus a good point estimate of the probabilistic interval [7]. The 
true payoff has an equal likelihood of being greater than or less than the midpoint. 
Uniform distributions will be used to map outcome payoffs. For a Uniform distribution 
the mean value and midpoint are synonymous. This instance of the Thesis Game Tree, 
where all payoff values assume the midpoint, will be used as an example in the next 
section, section III. As mentioned earlier probabilistic payoff values allows for payoff 
equivalency between different decisions. This is probabilistically unlikely; and, 
realistically players will always have a preference. In these rare instances another 
decision mechanism could be used, or decisions could be determined be risk tolerance. 
More likely, and more interesting, is the possibility that payoffs, hence preferences, will 
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be reordered with every instance of the simulation. For the moment disregard the game 
tree and look-at Figure 9. Consider Russia's preferences SQ, NEG and CAPUS there is a 
shared payoff space between these three decisions (Figure 9). 
Shared payoff space [70, 75] 
Figure 9. Equivalency in Russian payoff space 
Source: by the author 
This figure (Figure 9) illustrates that Russia's subjective payoff valuation for a 
SQ, NEG and CAPUS outcome can be equivalently valued in different instances of the 
game. What is more likely is that CAP assumes a high value simultaneously with a low 
value for NEG. This could make Conflictus the equilibrium outcome. The US, fearing a 
Russian attempt at CAPUS at node 9 would chose F4. 
3. THE GAME TREE: AN EXAMPLE AND THE FINAL MODEL 
Section 3. presents examples of the Thesis Game Tree model. The first example 
uses median values from the player's respective outcome payoff ranges as the perceived 
payoff value. The examples in this section are explained through forward induction. The 
following scenario in (a.) the median value scenario should be read as a narrative with the 
reader considering the leader's attempts at formulating a national policy based on the 
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evidence and assumptions at-hand. Section B examines a type of dichotomous fear 
during policy formulation, an aversion towards exploitation during a negotiation, and the 
angst (or lack of) associated with the possibility of war. This fear (or lack of) informs a 
leader's decision-making, thus affects their ordering of outcome preferences. 
a) An example instance of the model using mean values 
What follows is an example of the decision game using the mean values (in this 
instance synonymous with midpoint) for the probabilistic outcome payoffs. This 
example is explained through forward induction. But, the game was solved by backward 
induction. Backward induction will be discussed in some detail later. 
This researcher provides the US the first move. Knowledge, perceived threat, of 
an Islamist strategic safe-haven in Chechnya is considered the move by Nature, the event 
that begins the decision game. Given the initial conditions the US begins the game by 
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Figure 10. The Thesis Game Tree using preferential median values for outcome payoffs 
Source: by the author 
The model reflects that US domestic policy requires the defeat of Islamists; recall 
that from the US perspective: NEG > Conflict™ > SQ. If the US were not to demand 
from node 1, then Russia would not either. Russia knows that progressing the game past 
node 2 is not in its advantage. The US doesn't like the status quo, as a matter of fact, the 
US prefers Conflict™ [50] to SQ [35]. The US (D4) demands that Russia address its 
concern. 
A US demand followed by Russian acquiescence (ACQRussia) that is, Russia 
agrees to defeat, isolate or dislocate Islamists within its sphere of influence is possible in 
the Thesis Game Tree game. In this specific version of the game AC^ussm is a dominated 
course of action. However, consider that US policy makers, uncertain of Russian payoff 
values, might believe a Russian acquiescence a reasonable Russian decision. In this 
instance: 1) the US recognizes Russia's role in the region and thus its policy supremacy 
in the Caucasus; 2) Chechnya has been a security concern for Russia since 1818 and; 3) 
in general the US and Russia agree that radical Islamic terrorism is a threat to each state's 
individual national security and regional stability.17 These three instances illustrate the 
incomplete information as modeled in the thesis model. Defeating militant Islam and 
stabilizing the Caucasus should be a shared goal [8]. The concern of the two parties 
becomes who (which nation) decides what is considered "stable." 
Russia views things differently: 1) it has been involved in conflicts in Chechnya 
since 1994; 2) it views agreeing to US demands as risking domestic anger; 3) it considers 
US policy towards Afghanistan, Chechnya, the Middle-East, and Central Asia as 
hypocritical [9] and; 4) US and Russia have not been able to execute on past agreement, 
they have not taken joint action even when consensus had been achieved [10]. 
Russia will not acquiesce to US demands. The probabilistic median value for a 
ACgRussia i s [18j compared to a probabilistic median value of [21] for Conflict™. As 
mentioned earlier ACQRussm is dominated. As payoffs are expressed as a subset of values, 
not a single unique integer, from Russia's perspective a good Conflict™ (MAX[35]) is 
preferred to a bad AC(fussia (MIN[10]). This was first reported by Lalman, namely that 
decision-maker with a higher utility from war can go to war in situations of "incomplete 
information" [11]. The Thesis Game Tree is advanced to node 5 by a Russian counter-
17 Russia threatened attacks against Chechen allies, specifically Afghanistan in May 2000, for their 
material support of the Chechen rebels (Womack, 2000). Every President of the Chechen Republic of 
Ichkeria from 1994 to 2001 has allegedly met with Osama bin Laden. As noted in Chapter 2 the Second 
President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (Yandriejev) appears to have had close ties with the Taliban 
and Al-Qaeda. Recall from Chapter 2, the reports placing Osama bin Laden in Chechnya after the fall of 
the Taliban in Afghanistan (Souleimanov and Ditryvh, 2008). Finally, there are rumors, denied by ISAF, 
of Chechen fighters in Afghanistan. 
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demand (D8) at node 3. The game has entered the crisis sub-game (Figure 11). Payoffs to 
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Figure 11. The crisis sub-game of the Thesis Game Tree - US choices. 
Source: by the author 
The Russian counter-demand (at node 3) could be an insistence that the US 
remain out of the Caucasus while allaying the perceived Islamist threat. The US decides 
on the move from node 5. Expecting Russia to negotiate, from node 9 (a possible 
equilibrium point) requires that Russia not attempt to exploit the US and force a US move 
from node 12. Assuming that Russia values NEG more than ConflictRussia the US chooses 
not to use-force at node 9. At node 9 Russia has to evaluate its payoff value of [58] for 
NEG against ConflictRussia [30]. The NEG outcome is preferable. Russia decides not to 
use-force. The solution to this game is a negotiation. Though this was explained from 
the move by Nature at node 1 to its conclusion at NEG, this game was solved by 
backwards induction beforehand. The game is rolled back from the outcomes. 
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b) "What-if' - fear of exploitation and preference for conflict 
Though the sub-game perfect equilibrium is achieved through negotiation (in this 
particular instance) the reality of regional and domestic politics makes favorable 
negotiations problematic. Both sides require concessions by the other. Negotiations take 
time, eliminating the element of strategic surprise. The reader is asked to consider the 
following as it directly pertains to the creation of this model. 
The US understands that Russia may not capitulate (CAPRussia) because Russian 
capitulation to the US would damage Russia's influence in the region. However, as 
mentioned previously, the US cannot allow itself to be forced into a bad political decision 
from node 12. An examination of the utility spread for the US between Conflictus 
(MAX[70]) and negotiation (MIN[40]) reveals a large spread. Without a strong position 
during a negotiating a US initiated conflict is a reasonable outcome. Exploitation during 
a negotiation maybe less-preferred than a conflict. At node 5 the US perceives three 
outcomes down the -F4 branch. NEG is always preferable to the other two; they are 
dominated by NEG. An examination of the payoff ranges reveals that: 1) the US will 
never choose CAPUS over ConflictRussia and; 2) Russia will never choose CAP*"™" over 
Conflictus . These decisions are pruned away leaving the following choices for the US at 




Figure 12. "What-if' - dominated choices removed 
Source: by the author 
The literature and contemporary history support this type of scenario. Consider 
that: 1) despite the fact that Russia does not support new sanctions against Iran a majority 
of Americans (61%) do support military action against Iran (10/6 Pew poll); 2) by a 
margin of two to one, US presence in Iraq is viewed by Russians as a threat to global 
security, more so than a nuclear Iran [12]; 3) Russia has, and may still, sell arms to Iran, 
North Korea and Venezuela and; 4) Russia has provided little support to the NATO-led 
War in Afghanistan. Ironically, US efforts in Central Asia could produce an 'end' greater 
than what Russia sought in 1979, namely the removal of the terrorism (and the Taliban), 
the creation of a stable but feeble Afghanistan, a weakened NATO, and an exhausted US. 
In this very specific "what-if scenario, the author contends that for all of these reasons a 
negotiated settlement would not be reached; this conclusion, under similar circumstances 
has also been reached by Bueno de Mesquita [13]. 
Unique national mixtures of divergent foreign and domestic policies drive 
decisions in the game. The Russians view Iran as a responsible nation in the international 
community. Conversely, the US view's Iran as an emergent threat with a possible 
nuclear capability. Also noteworthy is the fact that the Russian Federation has managed 
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conflicts with radicalized Muslim groups along its Southern periphery since 1991. 
Afghanistan and Chechnya have been partners since 2000; most likely the relationship 
has earlier origins [14]. To Russians radical Islam in the Caucasus is nothing new; and, 
relations between al-Qaeda and Islamists in Chechnya is not new either. From Russia's 
perspective, the US choice to make Islamists in Chechnya an issue now seems to obscure 
US motives in the region. Proof of this lies in the fact that the US was openly critical of 
the Soviet-Afghanistan War, both Chechen Wars, and the threatened Russian attacks of 
May 2000 into Afghanistan against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. 
From the US point of view Russia is an antagonist, set on thwarting US progress 
and determined to undermine US national interests [15],[16]. First, Russia provides 
weapons to Iran, who in-turn provides weapons to insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan for 
use against American soldiers. Second, Russia uses its export of natural gas to former 
Soviet states as an enticement, the most immediate example being gas shipments to 
Ukraine in 2009. Third, Russia also attacked Georgia in the summer of 2009. Georgia is 
a US regional partner. The instigator and cause are debated, but Russia, by treaty 
obligation, should have removed its forces from South Ossetia years ago. Fourth, Russia 
consistently votes against the US in the UN Security Council. Russia insists that Georgia 
and Ukraine not become members of NATO, an outright attempt to influence Western 
policy towards Georgia and Ukraine. Russia opposed the proposed ballistic missile 
defense shield to be built in Eastern Europe, specifically in Poland and the Czech 
Republic, a shield that possessed no threat to Russian nuclear deterrence. Russia 
continues to attempt to corner the European energy market, thus gaining economic 
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influence with the EU. Finally, Russia has participated in naval exercises with Venezuela, 
while neither a seriously challenge nor threat, it did draw attention. In short Russia has 
contented itself with blocking US efforts whenever and wherever they may be. 
It is becoming apparent that the value that each nation places on a negotiate 
settlement is an important factor in the outcome of the conflict. This is expected to be the 
case for the simulation. It is believed that the majority of simulated solutions will be a 
negotiated (NEG) settlement or Conflict115. An ACQpussia is also possible. Likewise, but 
from the other side of the model it is highly improbable that a SQ outcome will ever be 
observed. 
c) The final version of the Thesis Game Model 
After the two examples, the midpoint payoff example from 3a. and; the "What-if' 
scenario from 3b., a few realizations regarding the structure of the game tree emerge. 
Examining the violent right-side of the game tree reveals that the two capitulation 
outcomes will never occur (Figure 8). Both nations can always do better than 
capitulation. This situation is reported in War and Reason by Domestic Proposition 3.3 
[17]. Capitulation is not an equilibrium point given fully informed players. While the 
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Source: by the author 
Additionally, an examination of the non-violent branch reveals more dominated 
courses of action (Figure 13). 
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Figure 14. Dominance of the violent right-branch 
Source: by the author 
The non-violent left-branch of the game (Figure 14) is almost completely 
dominated by the violent right-branch. If the US were to (-D4) Russia would (-D3). 
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There is no intersection in Russian payoff values for the SQ and ACQ sub-sets, and 
ACQUS>SQ. If Russia were to (DB) from node 2 the US would play tit-for-tat and (d4) at 
node 4. At node 6 Russia knows that US will (F4) at node 8 if Russia (FB) at node 6. 
The best course of action for the US and Russia would be a tit-for-tat sequence towards a 
NEG off of node 7. As fully informed players Russia will always {~DB) at node 2. 
Recognizing this US will rarely (-D4) at node 1. A SQ equilibrium outcome is possible, 
but highly improbably. This improbable event would occur when the following 
conditional preferences are met: 
for US: 
ACQP*sia >SQ> NEG > Conflict > Conflict
Russia 
for Russia: 
SQ > ConjlictRussia > NEG > ACQ*"™" > Conflict^ 
Recall that there is little intersection of US values for SQ [30, 40] and NEG [40, 
80]. Given full information the US will choose SQ as would Russia. The pruned version 
of the Thesis Game Tree is shown in Figure 15. 
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Figure 15. The pruned final version of the Thesis Game Tree 
Source: by the author 
The Domestic Proposition 3.6: Basic Status Quo Theorem supports the earlier statement 
[18]. It is possible for the US to equivalently value NEG [40, 80] and SQ [30, 40]. 
Specifically, the Thesis Game Tree can fill the requirements for (SQ outcome) Case 3, 
the additional constraints for the US: ConflictRussia > CAPUS and Russia: Conflict™ > 
CApRussia SQ> NEG [19]. 
This is the final version of the model (Figure 15). This version of the Thesis 
Game Tree will be used in the simulation study. The author recognizes that ConflictRuss,a 
is not a complete information equilibrium point. This conclusion coincides with the 
Domestic Proposition 3.2: Secondary War Theorem [20]. It remains an example of a 
policy mistake by the US. An instances in which the US expects Russia to negotiate, 
when their (-F4) is unexpectedly answered with (FB). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ITERATING THE MODEL - THE SIMULATION STUDY AND 
RESULTS 
Four simulations were created for this research: the Thesis Game Tree; the Mean 
Value Game; and two what-if scenarios. All of the simulations are automated 
abstractions of the sequential Thesis Game Tree is presented in the previous chapter. In 
the (simulated) games players make decisions' in order to maximize their payoff. 
Payoffs are randomly generated and attached to each of the five non-dominated outcomes 
(refer to Figure 15). Each game is solved through backward induction. In this way 
arriving at the solution to the game provides the strategy that each player will use. 
Backward induction will be discussed in more detail in the next section. 
All three stochastic games follow a similar simulation methodology. Each of 
these simulation experiments contains 30 trials of 30 iterations per trial. The quantitative 
data produced by the simulations is independent and identically distributed (IID). Thus 
the use of certain statistical tests is appropriate. Similarly the Law of large numbers 
(LLN) suggests that over a sufficiently large number of trials the average result will 
approach the expected value. The number of trials and iterations was chosen so that they 
would be statistically meaningful and subject to statistical analysis. On the other hand, 
the Mean-Value Game was only iterated once. The deterministic nature of the Mean-
Value Game allows for a single, stable solution. 
The Mean-Value Game was created to validate the mechanics of the spreadsheet 
simulation. The what-if scenarios were developed to explore policy possibilities, and to 
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provide predictive insight into the Thesis Game Tree. These scenarios address questions 
such as: (1) What-if Russia and the US were less certain of the payoff values associated 
with the prominent outcomes and; (2) What-if the US's preference for the SQ was 
increased. The answer to these questions provides insight into policy formation during 
conflict. Namely, player A's national policy, though unpopular with its competitor 
(player B), might be achievable provided enough effort by (player A) and incentive given 
to player B. This leads to concepts such as: predetermined decisions, threats, and side 
agreements. 
1. SIMULATION COMMNETARY AND CONSTRUCTION 
The four simulations are Monte Carlo spreadsheet simulations executed in 
Microsoft Excel. Excel was chosen because it is readily available and familiar to most 
students. The Mean-Value Game will be discussed first. 
In the Mean-Value Game the outcome payoff range was set to the mean value of 
their specific range (midpoint value). In this way the results from this deterministic 
spreadsheet simulation can be compared to the manual solution obtained in Chapter 3. If 
the results are identical the backward induction logic used in the spreadsheet simulation 
is without semantic error. 
a) Generating and mapping the data 
Excel generated ten pseudo-random variables and mapped them to a Uniform 
distribution. The ten variables represent the ten outcome payoffs, five possible pure 
strategy outcomes for each of the two players. These random variables where mapped to 
their preferential ranges as described in the previous chapter using equation 1. 
103 
y = a + x(b — a) (1) 
where a = lower boundary of the range, b = upper bounds of the range and x = is the 
psuedo- random variable produced by Excel. As an example, Russia's payoff perception 
of a SQ outcome is [70, 90]. Thus, in Excel the expression is (Equation 2). 
y = 70 + RAND(?0-7O) (2) 
This was true for the 900 instances of the Thesis Game Tree simulation (30 trials 
containing 30 iterations per trial). In the what-if scenarios these ranges were changed 
slightly. This was done to examine changes in policy and game outcome, resulting from 
the manipulation of the probabilistic payoff ranges. Once outcome payoff values are 
generated all that remains is solving the game. All versions of the game were solved 
through backward induction. 
b) Backward induction and its application in the simulation 
Backward induction consists of solving the game model from the bottom - up, 
from the last decision to the first. With sequential decision nodes the player (B) 
responsible for the bottom-most, last decision compares the two alternative payoffs 
values (perhaps outcomes #iand #2) associated with its decision. Player B is a subjective 
expected utility maximizer. For the sake of this example outcome #2 provides the 
maximum subjective expected utility (2 utils); player B will choose outcome #2. This 
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node, node 3, has a value for both players ([2, 2]) in this example. Player A now must 
choose between the value it would receive at node 3, 2 utils for a tit-for-tat strategy, or 
pursuing a policy of its own creation (perhaps an outcome of value 1 util). This choice 
rolls the game back to node 2; the value of the game now exists at node 2. In this 
example player A would choose a tit-for-tat strategy, conceding to player 2?'s choice (as 
[2 > 1]). Now player B must choose between the value at node 2 (the original value from 
node 3 given player A's choice of a tit-for-tat strategy [2, 2]), or striking out on its own. 
In this sequential, backwards method the game is regressed, solved to the move by 
Nature, the chance event that initiated the conflict. This method is adapted to the Thesis 
Game Tree, and illustrated in the next section. 
Note, in the figure the payoff values associated with the two outcomes have been 
removed for illustration purposes. In every simulation Russia (player B) begins by 
choosing between ConflictRussia and NEG at node 9 (Figure 16). This is the last, bottom-
most decision. This is the beginning step in backward induction. 
Figure 16. Thesis Game Tree - Russia's choice at node 9 
Source: by the author 
In the simulations this decision is made by an IF/ELSE statement that compares 
the generated payoff values associated with these two outcomes. Russia's choice is then 
held as the value at node 9. In this way the US then compares the value it would receive 
at node 9, and the value it associates with a Conflict outcome (Figure 17). 
Figure 17. US choice at node 5 
Source: by the author 
From node 5 the US chooses the greater value, the value at node 9 or the value of 
Conflictus. Recall that each player receives a payoff from every outcome. In making this 
decision the US is determining if the payoff it will receive given Russia's choice at node 
9 (either NEG or ConflictRussia) is better than its choice to initiate a conflict (Conflictus). 
The same process occurs at node 3. In this way the value of the previous node migrates 
back up the game tree. Players are choosing between the payoff value they receive at the 
previous node, and an alternative of their own choosing. At node 1 the US chooses 
between the value at node 3 or the SQ (Figure 18) 
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Figure 18. Thesis Game Tree - the US choice at node 1 
Source: by the author 
In this way the solution to the game is determined at node 1. 
What was discussed is a single iteration, or instance of the simulation. This 
process is automated in the spreadsheet. All of the stochastically simulated games 
included 30 trials, each containing 30 iterations. The Mean-Value Game was solved once 
since the payoff values attached to the outcomes were determined and constant. In this 
instance the payoff values associated with the outcomes were the mean value of the 
probabilistic ranges. For example, in the Thesis Game Tree Russia's valuation of the SQ 
is expressed as being uniformly distributed in a range between [70, 90]. The mean value 
of this range is 80. Russia's expected subjective valuation of the SQ is 80. Since in this 
simulation the associated player's specific payoff valuation is a single number this 
simulation can be solved explicitly. This is done and reported on in section II. A. Before 
discussing the results some detail specific to the what-if scenarios is necessary. 
As mentioned there are two what-if simulations: (1) payoff uncertainty and, (2) 
increased preference for the SQ (by the US). The uncertainty scenario, the first one of the 
two, models an increase in uncertainty for Russia. This scenario was developed because 
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there was a concern that a small change in a single payoff for one of the two players 
might have a significant impact on the outcome of the simulation. The obvious 
implication of this would be that the model is too sensitive for practical value, unless very 
detailed data can be used to create the probabilistic payoff ranges. If changing the payoff 
range from [40, 60] to [30, 60] does not cause significant changes in the aggregated 
outcome, then the researcher can be confident that a reasonably precise appraisal of 
player preference values' is appropriate for the model. In this case a significant change is 
defined as the changing of prevalent outcomes. The status quo scenario is an extension 
on the uncertainty scenario. 
The status quo scenario addresses the notion that leaders might choose to 
maintain the SQ, postponing a tough decision for someone else. In this scenario the US 
still holds NEG in high regards but is less certain of the payoff (policy results) of a SQ 
outcome. This is reflected by a larger probabilistic range. And, the US is unable to 
discern the differences in the upper bounds of the two probabilistic payoffs (SQ and 
Conflictus). If the President of the US is able to mollify public concerns and present 
himself as a confident statesman this outcome might be slightly more appealing than a 
successful military operation. But, a costly conflict is less preferred over an 
uncomfortable SQ. These concepts are modeled by changing the uniform distributions, 
as perceived by the US to: SQ [40, 65] and Conflict^ [30, 60]. 
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2. SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS 
The results from the Thesis Game Tree simulation will be discussed second (in 
section II.B) the Mean-Value Game will be next. And, a discussion of the results of the 
what-if scenarios will conclude this section, and is contained in II.C. 
a) The Mean-Value Game 
The mean value is the mathematical average of a set of numbers. Specific to a 
uniform distribution a mean value can be computed using: 
\ (a + b) (3) 
Russia's valuation of ConflictRussia is uniformly distributed in the range [15, 45]. Using 
equation 3 the mean value for ConflictRuss,a is [30]. Adapting this to the game tree 
furthers this research in two ways. 
First, the result of the Mean-Value Game provides face validity to the simulation 
used to execute the Thesis Game Tree. Second, the Mean-Value Game also acts as a 
base-line for the comparison of the Thesis Game Tree and the two what-if scenarios. 
The solution to the game was manually determined and presented in Chapter 3. A 
mean-value game, a game in which outcome payoffs are set to the mean-value of their 
probable range should produce a negotiated outcome. The simulation did produce a NEG 
outcome (Figure 19). 
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Figure 19. Results from the Mean-Value Game 
At node 9 Russia prefers NEG to ConflictRussia. Later, at node 5 the US prefers the 
value of the game at node 9 to Conflict . Subsequently, at node 3 Russia prefers the 
values of the game at node 5 (the value originally from node 9) to the value of ACQPuss,a. 
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Figure 20. Solving the Mean-value Game 
Source: by the author 
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b) The Thesis Game Tree 
The long-run mean value for all 900 samples is shown in Table 1. The mean 
value is the population mean of the thirty trial means. The complete summary statistics 
and analysis is provided in section III. The detailed reporting of the data is contained in 
Appendix A. 









The Thesis Game Tree simulation depicts a complex sequence of events in which 
future events are influenced by posterior outcomes wherein all events are based on 
probabilities. A few issues should be considered. 
The most striking observation is that there are no SQ outcomes. Neither are there 
any mixed strategy outcomes. The simulation logic allows for both of these outcomes. 
Though they are possible mixed strategy and SQ outcomes are highly improbable. 
A mixed strategy outcome is possible because of the intersection in outcome 
payoff value ranges. This payoff intersection allows for outcomes of equivalent value; 
modeling a sort of indecision or complete uncertainty. That is {NEG = ConflictRussia) is 
possible. If this occurred, in the short term, or in a single instance Russia cannot, strictly 
I l l 
speaking, maximize its payoff. There is no way of knowing which decision is better, 
even after the fact. Over the long-term, however, Russia could use a chance device, flip-
a-coin, or choose a 50%/50% strategy, where-in they choose ConflictRussia half of the 
time, and NEG the other half of the time. A mixed strategy outcome was never observed. 
Figure 21 is illustrative of a single instance of a game. With this as a guide a more 
detailed discussion of the model, specifically why these two outcomes are improbable 





































Figure 21. An instance of the Thesis Game Tree 
Consider that Russia chooses between NEG [75] and ConflictRussia [value of 45] at 
node 9. Next, at node 5, the US chooses the value associated with Russia's decision, a 
negotiated settlement [value of 47] (NEG > ConflictRussia) or the value of Conflict™ 
[value of 63]. This rolls the game back to node 3. At node 3 Russia prefers a US 
initiated conflict [value of 19] to its own acquiescence [value of 14]. Finally, at node 1 
the US compares the maintenance of the SQ [value of 34] to a US initiated conflict [value 
of 63]. The outcome solution to the game is a conflict begun by the US. For a mixed 
strategy outcome to occur both of the following conditions must be met: 
Vale at Node 9 {for US) Value at Node 9 (lor Russia) 
47 75 
Value at Node 5 {for US) Value at Node 5 (for Russia) 
63 19 
Value at Node 3 (for US) Value at Node 3 (tor Russia) 
63 19 
Value at Node 1 (for US) Value at Node 1 (for Russia) 
63 19 
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(1) Russia's value for NEG AND ConflictRuss,a must be equivalent, and between 
40 and 45 utils (NEG • ConflictRussia = [40, 45] -> ValueNode9). The equivalency value 
would be stored in node 9 (ValueNode9). 
(2) The US valuation of Conflictus must equal the payoff value it would receive 
at node 9 (Conflict™ = ValueNode9) 
Since all of the outcome events are independent of one another (the values are all 
instantiated simultaneously) the joint probability can be calculated as: 
(3) 
A: ConflictRuss,a = 40 utils (given range is uniformly distributed in [15, 45]. 
P(A) = (1/30) = (0.033) 
B: NEG = 40 utils (given range is uniformly distributed in [40, 75]). 
P(B) = (1/35) = (0.0029) 
The P(AnB) = P(A)P(B) = (0.033)(0.029) = (0.00096) = P(C) 
The value for P(C) is associated with [40]. We need to account for [41, 45] so-
(0.00096)(5) = 0.0048 or approximately 0.5% 
(4) Now consider the probability that the US valuation of Conflict™ will = 40. 
D: Conflict™ = 40 utils (given range is uniformly distributed in [30, 70]. 
P(D) = (1/40) = (0.025) or 2.5%. 
The probability that Russia's assessment of Conflict*1"1"0 and NEG = [value of 40] 
(from node 9); and that the US's valuation of Conflict = [value of 40] (from node 5) is 
equal to (0.00096)*(0.025) = 0.000024 or 0.0024%. This only accounts for the single 
value, "40". Other points of intersection within the three subsets were not included in 
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this example. This illustration is meant to show the improbable nature of a mixed 
strategy outcome. A mixed strategy outcome seems to be improbable. A similar 
analytical method shows that a SQ outcome is even less probable given the US valuation 
of SQ. 
c) "What-if' games 
The first game explores the concept of uncertainty in decision-making. In this 
scenario the Russian valuation of aACC^"^'" is less certain; but, it is more favorable than 
previously, now the range is set to [10, 35] (from [10, 25]). In the model this means that 
it is difficult for Russia to distinguish the difference between their payoff from a "good" 
Conflict™ or a "good" ACQP"3'". The maximum payoff value associated with these two 
outcomes, from the Russian perspective, is [value of 35]. Conversely, in this scenario US 
uncertainty is decreased. This equates to a change in the US's valuation of Conflict™ (to 
[30, 60] from [30, 70]). This experiment included 30 trials. Each trial included 30 
iterations. The results are provided in Table 2. The mean value is the mean of the thirty 
trial means. 











It was expected that manipulating the payoff ranges would directly affect the 
outcome. The analysis of the results produces two revelations, first, the mean value for 
negotiation increased by almost 9%, from 72% to 81%. The frequency of Russian 
acquiescence changes slightly; but, the US initiated conflict outcome frequency is more 
than cut in half (from 16% to 6%). Second, an increase in uncertainty in the simulation, 
modeled by larger payoff probability ranges, was expected to cause an equal skewing in 
the outcome standard deviation. This was not the case. 
The range of payoff values for Conjlictus (as seen by the US) was reduced from 
[30, 70] to [30, 60]. The range of payoff values for AC(fussia (as seen by Russia) was 
increased from [10, 25] to [10, 35]. In both instances the standard deviation did increase 
slightly. There is a direct correlation between Russia's perception of the value of 
ACQ^uss,a and an increase in the standard deviation associated with the frequency of 
AC(^fussia. It would seem that the less certain a player is of an outcome the less likely 
they are to make decisions leading to that outcome. The frequency of AC<^ussia increased 
slightly from an average of [3.87] (in a trial of 30) in the Thesis Game Tree to [3.53] in 
the uncertainty scenario. 
Regarding Conflict115, the frequency with which a conflict outcome was produced, 
and the standard deviation across the 30 trials both decreased. The standard deviation 
specific to conflict for the 30 trials decreased from [2.21] to [1.41]. More noticeable is 
the decrease in the frequency with which conflict occurred. It decreased from a value of 
[4.77] to a value of [ 1.77] (in an average trial of 30 iterations). It can be argued that a 
player might make a choice based on the possibility of a higher payoff, even if it is less 
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probable. The standard deviation statistics comparing the Thesis Game Tree simulation 
to the What-if: uncertainty scenarios are reported in Table 3. 
Table 3. Standard deviations for the uncertainty scenario 
Standard Deviation 












Applying these decisions to the game tree, and examining them from a practical, 
policy viewpoint highlights the following: at node 9 there is no change between Russia's 
probabilistic valuation of either NEG or ConjlictRussia. However, at node 5 the US's 
valuation of a US initiated conflict is reduced. But, the US will always choose to attack 
over being attacked. The decreased valuation of Conflictus means that there should be 
more instances in which the US chooses to negotiate. These two considerations explain 
why there are more NEG outcomes. Specifically, a NEG settlement is probabilistically 
well regarded by both player; and, the US's valuation of Conflict has decreased. To 
understand why the number ofACQ*"™1" change only slightly we must again consider the 
change in the value of Conflict . The US values conflict less than it did before. Then, 
there will be more instances in which the US chooses to negotiate because the 
intersection in the area under the US's two distribution curves, (NEG and Conflict"*) has 
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decreased by one-third. Or, conversely, Russia's offer ofNEG looks better by thirty-
percent. 
The second and final what-if scenario examines the maintenance of the status 
quo. In this scenario the changes made in the previous scenario are maintained, namely, 
an increase in Russian uncertainty regarding ACQRuss,a, and a decrease in US uncertainty 
and valuation of Conflict . In addition, the status quo payoff as viewed by the US was 
changed to [40, 65]. The inspiration behind this scenario was the idea that whatever 
event might have caused the US to adjust its preference range for Conflictus could affect 
its valuation of the SQ as well. Effectively a conflict is no longer as pleasing as it might 
have otherwise been; thus the status quo looks just a little better than it did before. These 
modifications produced a statistically significant number of SQ outcomes (Table 4). 
The maintenance of the status quo now makes up 22% of the outcomes. What is 
interesting is that the US probabilistic valuation for SQ [40, 65] is comparably similar to 
[30, 60] for Conflictus. Even given significant intersection within the two payoff ranges 
Conflictus only accounted for 3% of the total outcomes. This highlights that maintaining 
the SQ need not be probabilistically much preferred over other outcomes. 
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This chapter concludes with a few points regarding policy as it pertains to the 
outcomes of the four games presented in this thesis. Specifically, it includes a discussion 
on the relationship between the Thesis Game Tree and the two what-if scenarios. Finally, 
section 3. will also include additional statistical tests pertinent to the reliability of the 
model. 
3. INTERPRETATION AND POLICY ANALYSIS 
Common statistical test data is reported and interpreted in section 3a. Section 3b. 
takes this data and applies it qualitatively to Game Theory policy, the effect on political 
policy formulation is covered in the final chapter. That is, how the game should be 
played (Game Theory policy) versus how political policies might be crafted (political 
policy) based on the information input into the model. 
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a) Statistical testing and interpretation 
The statistics tests conducted for this thesis involves the Thesis Game Tree. This 
seemed appropriate as the two what-if scenarios were adaptation of the aforementioned 
model. Table 5 provides common statistical data regarding the Thesis Game Tree. 

















Assuming normality, the confidence interval range is associated with a 95% 
confidence interval. In 95 out of 100 sample trials we should get a frequency mean, for 
NEG, between 21.67 and 21.73. In a sufficiently large sampling of IID trials, with each 
trial containing 30 iterations, a two-thirds majority of the outcomes should be NEG. 
Previously probabilistic mean values have been reported. Here (Table 5) the mean values 
are associated with the population frequency of an outcome in a 30 iteration trial, as 
opposed to the probabilistic likelihood of observing a specific outcome. 
The outcome data pertaining to the occurrence of a NEG settlement for the Thesis 
Game Tree when fit to a distribution fits to a Normal distribution (Figure 23). Increasing 
the number of trials might reveal a bimodal Normal distribution. There were 30% more 
Conflictus outcomes than ACQ^uss,a in the Thesis Game Tree. However, this could also 
be a chance outcome that is neither sustained in larger experiments, nor repeatable. 
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Figure 22. Frequency of NEG fit to a distribution curve 
Source: by the author, using Arena's Input Analyzer 
The Chi-square p-value is 0.336. Since the p-value is greater than 0.05 the results 
of the simulation can be ascribed to chance. In this instance the structure of the game 
drives decision-making. The model does not contain a biased component that could 
influence the simulation output. The implication of this is that the Normal distribution 
could be used to approximate the results of this model. These tests and the histogram 
were conducted using Arena's Input Analyzer. 
b) Policy analysis and possible strategy implications 
The four simulations were discussed in this chapter: 1) the Thesis Game Tree; 2) 
the Mean-Value Game; 3) "What-if': uncertainty and; 4) "What-if': status quo. Three 
policy conclusions are drawn from these three outcomes. 
First, simply changing a payoff value for a single player will not necessarily 
change the outcome of a probabilistic game. This was not unexpected. The author 
understood the complex nature of the simulations but, was surprised by the results 
obtained in the "What-if: status quo simulation. Moving the lower-boundary slightly 
while increasing the upper-boundary had a large, noticeable effect in the occurrence of a 
SQ outcome. This is instructive. Such modifications could be modeled as a side-
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agreement, or possibly a threat. If new information were brought into the simulation at 
every node, a re-evaluation of payoff values would be required. This re-evaluation would 
affect the outcome of the game. In this instance only US values regarding the 
maintenance of the SQ were manipulated. This illuminates the importance of the second 
player (here a nation) in conflict decision-making. 
Second, the "other" player makes difference in the outcome. Though the US 
probabilistically prefers SQ to Conflict there was still conflict in the "What-if' - status 
quo scenario. Additionally, from the US perspective the mean value associated with 
NEG was [60] while the mean value for SQ was [53] with ranges [40, 80] and [40, 65] 
respectively. This was capable of producing numerous SQ outcomes, 22% in the 
experiment aggregate. Examine any game tree used in this thesis and consider an 
instance of the What-if: SQ game. In this game it is possible that Russia could prefer 
ConflictRussia and the US prefer Conflictus to a negotiation but the solution of the game 
could end up being the maintenance of the status quo. This is a form of the classic 
Hawk-Dove Game. In this thesis version of the game an unpopular SQ is perceived as 
favorable to losing in a NEG or risking a conflict. The third and final point deals with the 
Mean-Value game. 
Randomness is an important aspect of modeling and simulation. This thesis has 
reinforced this by discounting the deterministic outcome of the Mean-Value Game when 
compared to the thirty trials from the Thesis Game Tree. The Thesis Game Tree model 
was created with probabilistic payoff values to denote decision-maker uncertainty. A 
national leader can reasonably expect the payoff of his decision to fall within certain 
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boundaries as defined by a lower and upper boundary. They cannot precisely define the 
value of an outcome. Simply using the mean value of these payoff ranges would not be 
appropriate in many instances for reasons similar to those which govern the 
inappropriateness of using mean values in a queuing model. Put another way, using the 
mean value is appropriate in some instances as per the law of large numbers (LLN). It is 
not appropriate in others. In a single or small number of instances (or samples) the law 
(LLN) does not apply. Since decisions are made once applying the LLN, hence mean-
values, to decision-making could produce unpleasant consequences. While aleatory 
uncertainty cannot be reduced epistemic uncertainty can. What does this mean for 
decision-makers in the complex environment? Decision-makers could look to further 
develop the problem and gather more information about the context as opposed to 
manipulating a model and attempting to "find the solution". For example, a reassessment 
of the decisions risks could change payoff values by lowering costs or raising payoffs. 
This new knowledge, revealed by changes in probabilistic payoff rangers would change 




1. CHECHNYA AS AN ISLAMIST SAFE HAVEN 
Islamists need a new safe haven. Military operations in Marja, Afghanistan 
during April 2010 are disrupting the last Islamist safe haven in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, 
Pakistan continues to fight militant Islam within its own borders. The US, NATO and 
their regional partner Pakistan, have made steady progress towards the achievement of 
their political, tactical and strategic goals over the last six months. 
Chechnya is a suitable location for an Islamist safe haven. Like Afghanistan 
Chechnya is predominantly Sunni Muslim and, it has been devastated by years of 
conflict. Though the people of Chechnya are of a different ethnic background the author 
contends that this is a minor impediment. As noted in Chapter 2 there are historical, 
political ties between Chechen rebel organizations and the Afghani Taliban. Similarly, 
notable Chechens, including the Second President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria 
maintained a supportive relationship with al Qaeda in the early 1990s. The author 
contends that general Chechen population would aid, or ignore the actions of fellow 
Muslims in Chechnya, as opposed to disrupting their operations for the sake of the US. 
Another consideration is that Chechnya is in the Russian sphere of influence. 
Any action taken against Chechen Islamists by the US or NATO comes with the 
realization that Chechnya: 1) is strategically located on Russia's border and; 2) a former 
oblast of the USSR. Chechnya's capital, Grozny is near Volgograd; current day 
Chechnya is literally on Russia's vulnerable southern border. Many of Russia's 
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metropolises are north-west of Volgograd, including Moscow. An American military 
force in Chechnya would seem to be an unacceptable risk for Russia. American money 
and American culture come with American soldiers. These political considerations affect 
the decision calculus in Russia and the US. For the US these considerations drive up the 
cost of what could already be a costly military operation. For Russia militant Islam in 
Chechnya has been the norm for almost two-hundred years. US protestations regarding a 
Chechen safe haven would fall on deaf-ears; the US was a vocal critic of Russia during 
both of its wars (with Islamic militants) in Chechnya. 
Under certain conditions and given specific policy objectives, it would be 
reasonable to assert that Russia might gain by allowing the creation of an Islamist safe 
haven in Chechnya. Russia has regional military and political concerns, namely China. 
But, the US is Russia's contemporary rival. It has been argued that a US administration 
harried by Islamists, and concerned with Iran is a US that is less likely to devise anti-
Russian policies [1]. Given assurances to Russia, an Islamist safe haven in Chechnya 
could, in effect diminish US power. This seems like a risky gambit. But, as mentioned 
in Chapter 2 there are credible reports indicating that prominent Russian officials knew 
of, and tacitly approved of, the invasion of Dagestan by Shamil Baseyev [2]. It was 
believed that a small conflict would steel Russian domestic political support behind 
Yeltsin; it would provide a political gain. This adds credibility to the aforementioned 
notion of a Russian backed Islamists safe haven in Chechnya. 
Finally, political and economic conditions in Chechnya, the author contends, are 
only stable in appearance. Russia is rebuilding Chechnya. Chechnya does not appear to 
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be capable of rebuilding itself. It is uncertain what Chechnya could do by itself given the 
devastation of its infrastructure. As for the current President of Chechnya, some 
Chechens see a correlation between president Kadyrov and improving conditions in 
Chechnya [3]. On the other hand, others see no progress. Kadyrov is popular with some; 
they see him as a problem solver. The opposite is also true. Many simply fear him. 
What would happen if Russia were unable, or unwilling, to continue funding 
efforts to rebuild Chechnya? Russia's economy is hitched to its energy reserves, 
specifically oil and natural gas. Global oil prices have been relatively flat since the 
heights of the summer of 2008. Russia's economy is expected to continue to shrink [4]; 
and, Putin is becoming more unpopular. Could Kadyrov be replaced by an Islamist 
government? If so what would happen? An analysis of the literature, as presented in 
Chapter 2, indicates that the Kadyrovsky's which have been so important to Kadyrov's 
survival could be the instrument of his removal. This could provide Russia a reason to 
suspend rebuilding operations. And, it could also keep the US on edge for awhile longer. 
Likewise, weaker Caucasus states might be willing to accept Russian security assistance, 
strengthening Russia's role in the Caucasus as a whole. In short, Russia could get a 
weapon and trans-national Isalmists could get a shield. In short, at face-value it might 
seem unlikely that Russia and Chechnya would allow trans-national Islamists a safe-
haven in Chechnya. However, a deeper analysis reveals that though unlikely, there are 
numerous reasons why Islamists could relocate to Chechnya. Given this supposition the 
model and simulation provide future policy outcomes when given a range of outcome 
preferences for the US and Russia. 
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2. THE MODEL AND THE METHODOLOGY 
The author's analysis is used to develop probabilistic preference ranges for a 
Game Theory model. The author's work follows work done by Bueno de Mesquita in 
War and Reason. The US and Russia are in a state of political conflict. Each nation is 
attempting to maintain their national security policy regarding: (1) Islamists and (2) 
Chechnya. 
The probabilistic payoff preferences mimic natural decision-making. The US 
would prefer that Russia give in to its demands. For its own reasons' Russia would 
prefer not to. From the US perspective a 'bad' negotiation can be worse than a 'good' 
conflict. But, both of these outcomes are strictly preferred to the status quo. In Game 
Theory strictly preferred outcomes are removed. Alternative outcomes in the game 
dominate the inferior outcomes. Dominated outcomes are not pursued in a game with 
full information and rational players. 
Specific to payoff preferences, Russia views things differently than the US. The 
status quo is good for Russia. In April 2009 Russia ceased military operations in 
Chechnya after fifteen years of armed, military conflict. Russia is beginning to regain a 
position of global influence, a portion of its former strength. Thus, giving in to US 
demands rates poorly as it would diminish the perception of Russian power. It is the 
author's assessment that a conflict with the US would be costly for both nations; but, a 
conventional armed conflict between Russia and the US could be the end of Russia. But, 
a limited conflict waged by a Russian proxy, Chechen Islamists, could sap American 
power. This is especially true if the Islamists could affect US interests outside of the 
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Caucasus; and, if the US can be kept outside of the Caucasus. This conflicted decision-
making is modeled well by Game Theory. 
Game Theory illuminates why decision-makers arrive at what appear to be 
suboptimal outcomes. The decision-makers seek to maximize their own subjective 
expected utility but, they are thwarted by their opponent who is attempting to do likewise. 
The status quo game is an example of such a situation. Both nations could prefer to 
initiate a conflict and, neither wants to negotiate. In this instance the structure of the 
game could produce a status quo outcome. Applying this to the literature, in effect the 
US knows that Russia would rather initiate a conflict than enter into what it expects could 
be a contentious negotiation. The US feels the same way. The US also knew that 
Russian acquiescence is an unreasonable expectation. Thus, if the US issues a demand 
Russia would follow, in which case the US would have to initiate a conflict ahead of 
Russia. Fearing a costly conflict the US chose to maintain the status quo. The Thesis 
Game Tree offers a different scenario. Two-thirds of the outcomes in the Thesis Game 
Tree were NEG. In these would-be futures neither country desires a conflict. 
3. LOGICAL VALIDITY OF THE MODEL 
The complex adaptive nature of this modeling approach creates combinatorial 
complexity, making the problem computationally intractable. Simulation can be used to 
address this problem. 
Much of the complexity in the model exists because of the second player. The 
model and the simulation illustrate the important role that the second player has in 
decision-making. In the Thesis Game Tree model a host of probabilities affect every 
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player's decision. Plainly, players are making decisions in uncertain conditions. Neither 
player can fix a value to any of the outcomes for themselves or their opponent. They 
only have a notion of what they and their opponent prefer in broad terms. 
The Thesis Game Tree was solved manually using mean values for the player's 
outcome payoff values. This produced a negotiated settlement. Later, this scenario was 
created in an Excel spreadsheet based Monte Carlo simulation. Using the exact same 
values the simulation produced a negotiated settlement. This test validated the IF/ELSE 
logic used in the spreadsheet to produce a solution to the game through backward 
induction. The Thesis Game Tree was then engaged through simulation, and 900 
outcome results were returned within 30 trials. Each trial contained 30 instances of the 
model. A negotiated settlement accounted for 72% of the outcomes. A conflict initiated 
by the US accounted for 16% of the outcomes. Russian acquiescence accounted for the 
rest (12%). Statistical tests verified that these results were robust. A 95% confidence 
interval range indicated that more than 21 of the 30 outcomes in a given trial (30 
iterations per trial) should be negotiated settlements. 
Finally, the "what-if' scenarios presented in Chapter 4 demonstrated the 
flexibility and descriptive capabilities of this model and its methodology. The author 
affirms that Game Theory, the International Interaction game in general, and the Thesis 
Game Tree in specific can be useful heuristic decision analysis tools. Their structure 
provides enough rigor to prevent recurrent logical errors without requiring extensive 
specialized education or analytical tools. Their mathematical foundation allow for 
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quantitative comparisons and analysis that are intuitive and repeatable. This study also 
highlights the role of uncertainty in decision making. 
Uncertainty plays a role in conflict. To be human is to error. From the author's 
perspective determinism in decision support is a questionable proposition. Rational, 
powerful decision-makers at the pinnacle of their profession and, in the greatest states of 
their generation are often confronted by the unknown. The application of probability to 
these models increases their usefulness because it increases their acceptability. 
Finally, this research provides a template for the application of probability based 
Game Theory studies in the social sciences. The research offers a methodology for 
combining qualitative analysis with quantitative models and methods. The research 
provides a method through which the problem statement or research question is bounded 
within the body of qualitative literature. Later, with the refined research question in-hand 
the quantitative model can be developed and simulated using a number of methods and 
tools. 
4. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
This section is divided into two categories, (a.) recommendations for 
improvement on the model, and (b.) possible application. 
a) Recommendations for improvement 
Two obvious recommendations involve the payoff ranges. First, the payoff 
ranges are derived by the author from the qualitative literature. These value ranges are 
the result of the author's analysis, experience and knowledge. The quantitative data does 
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not exist. It is likely to never exist; every game or application of the model is likely to 
have its own unique context, constraints, and players. All three of these parameters 
impact on the structure of the model, the preferential ordering of probabilistic outcomes, 
and the value ranges associated with probabilistic outcomes. Consider that the 
methodology in this thesis could be applied to other decision-making instances. The 
model and methodology contained in this thesis could be used to model decision-making 
in a political conflict between South Korea and Japan, or Brazil and Venezuela. In every 
instance the payoff values attached to the underlying structure of the game would have to 
be derived at the moment. Second, not obvious from this research, is the lack of a third 
player or an external agent. 
In Game Theory payoff values express all of the associated gains and costs of 
decision-making. Since payoff values are attached to the end game it is difficult to 
update decisions. Conflicts between two nations generally affect other nations; they are 
stakeholders in the outcome. From a practical stand point their influence on the players 
should be modeled somehow. With Game Theory this is a difficult task. In the 
Chechnya scenario contained in the thesis, the US decisions to continually escalate to 
Conflictus might be more infrequent if the US had to deal with a similar escalation of 
international political rhetoric. Generally these considerations are modeled implicitly. 
Payoffs are said to encompass everything, all costs and all gains. This does not seem 
adequate given the action, reaction, counter-action paradigm in international relations. 
Third and finally, this model suffers because it does not explicitly allow for 
decision updating. While uncertainty, depicted by probabilistic outcome payoffs, can 
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implicitly model decision updating it is inadequate in application. The usefulness of the 
model and its simulation methodology are limited by three points: 
1) derivation and assignment of outcome payoff ranges 
2) inability to account for "additional players" 
3) the lack of decision-updating. 
b) Areas for possible application 
The author believes the strength of this model and its simulation lies in its 
simplicity, flexibility and illustrative nature. 
An individual with minimal understanding of Game Theory could determine their 
own problem statement, conduct their own analysis, build a similar model, remove 
dominated branches (outcomes), engage a simulation, and produce meaningful results. In 
this instance, this thesis has elucidated the strengths of the International Interaction 
Game. These models (International Interaction Game and the Thesis Game Tree) and can 
be applied to almost any conflict. With some modification these models could be used in 
n-person games. This could be accomplished through coalition forming, or simply by 
modeling the actions of major players within a system and disregarding other players. 
Presumably minor players in the anarchic international system will coalesce around 
power players be it a bi-polar or multi-polar system. This argument is made by Organski 
and Kugler in The War Ledger [5]. Bueno de Mesquita created a similar model for 
policy formulation and implementation within European Community Decision Making 
[6]. 
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The methodology illustrates the complex nature of decision-making when the two 
players are in conflict. But, it hints are solutions to the problem. I can be used to explain 
why suboptimal decisions are reached by competing parties and, why in some instances 
the result is not only suboptimal but surprising. 
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Trials 1 to 30 listed on the left side of the spreadsheet. Trial 1 (recall there were 
30 iterations per trial) contained \9NEG, 5 AC(fussia and 6 Conflict11* outcomes. 
Negotiation resulted in 63% (0.63) of all outcomes within Trial 1. On average there were 
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21.70 NEG (total population mean) outcomes out of 30. The 95% Confidence Interval 
range is [21.67, 21.73]. 
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